

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/PV.480
21 July 1970
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTIETH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 21 July 1970, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. J. VRATUSA

(Yugoslavia)

(Previous verbatim records in this series appeared under the symbols
ENDC/PV.1-ENDC/PV.430).

GE.70-16286
70-35474

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Argentina:

Mr. C. ONTIZ de ROZAS

Mr. A.F. DUMONT

Mr. V.E. BERASATEGUI

Brazil:

Mr. R.E. SARAIVA GUERREIRO

Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA

Bulgaria:

Mr. T. PETROV

Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV

Burma:

U KYAW MIN

Canada:

Mr. G. IGNATIEFF

Mr. R.W. CLARK

Mr. R.E. MOORE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA

Mr. J. STRUCKA

Mr. F. MARESKA

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ZELLEKE

Mr. G. ALEMU

Hungary:

Mr. J. PETRAN

Mr. I. SARKADI

Mr. F. GAJDA

Ind'a:

Mr. M.A. HUSAIN

Mr. N. KRISHNAN

Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. R. CARACCILO

Mr. F.L. OTTIERI

Mr. R. BORSARELLI

Mr. U. PESTALOZZA

Japan:

Mr. H. TANAKA
Mr. H. OTSUKA
Mr. T. SENGOKU
Mr. J. SAKAMOTO

Mexico:

Mr. J. CASTANEDA
Mr. B. SEPULVEDA
Mr. R. VALERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. Z. ERENDO

Morocco:

Mr. M.A.A. KHATTABI
Mr. A. BENKIRANE

Netherlands:

Mr. H.F. ESCHAUZIER
Mr. E. BOS

Nigeria:

Mr. C.O. HOLLIST
Mr. L.A. MALIKI

Pakistan:

Mr. K. AHMED
Mr. S.A.D. BUKHARI
Mr. T.O. HYDER

Poland:

Mr. W. NATORF
Mr. K. ZYBYLSKI
Mr. H. STEPOSZ

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU
Mr. N. CHILIE

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Mr. A. EDELSTAM
Mr. O. DAHLEN
Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. I.I. TCHEPROV
Mr. L.A. MASTERKOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALAF
Mr. O. SIRRY
Mr. Y. RIZK
Mr. M. ISMAIL

United Kingdom:

Mr. I.F. PORTER
Mr. J.T. MASEFIELD
Mr. R. HOULISTON
Mr. L.W. BOYES

United States of America:

Mr. J.F. LEONARD
Mr. A.F. NEIDLE
Mr. W. GIVAN
Mr. R.L. McCORMACK

Yugoslavia:

Mr. A. VRATUSA
Mr. M. BOZINOVIC
Mr. M. VUKOVIC

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Yugoslavia): I declare open the 480th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.
2. Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): Time marches on. I feel the urge to take up today for closer consideration the subject of chemical and biological means of warfare, to which some, but not sufficient, attention has so far been given in this session. But allow me at the outset to voice some general concern about our work schedule.
3. Within the next month we must complete action on at least four important items in order to report to the United Nations General Assembly in accordance with the mandates given to us. That constitutes a formidable workload. In the first instance we must obviously arrive at formulating a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Next, we hope to be able to arrive at a final and preferably unanimously-agreed draft sea-bed treaty. That presupposes that all amendments to the present text (CCD/269/Rev.2) must be in within this or next week; although I take it that most of them have been presented more or less textually in the statements by delegations; and some of those amendments have received very broad support. Further, we have the task of submitting a special report on the comprehensive test ban (General Assembly resolution 2604 B (XXIV); CCD/275). If that is not done, or if the report is without substance, that will constitute a particularly glaring failure on the part of our Committee. And we must carry forward our work on the banning of the production, testing and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons, at least far enough to be able to make it manifest that we have mastered the general shape of such a prohibitive measure.
4. Already in my statement on 9 April (CCD/PV.463) I touched upon some elements which my delegation considers should be included in such a treaty. In the meantime we have given further thought to the subject; and I should like today to share with my colleagues some more specific suggestions. We have taken as a basis for our considerations the draft convention put forward by nine delegations in New York last year (A/7655) as amended here in April (CCD/285). The main reason for this is that it covers both chemical and biological means of warfare. That does not mean, however, that we have neglected the contents of the United Kingdom draft convention on biological warfare (ENDC/255/Rev.1), amended as suggested by the delegation of the United States to include also toxins (CCD/290) -- a suggestion which was accepted

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

by the United Kingdom delegation at our last meeting (CCD/PV.479, paras. 12 et seq.) It contains useful elements which could also be applied to the broader ban including all chemical weapons.

5. What I shall do tentatively in the following statement amounts to giving a description of the main features, as my delegation would like to see them formulated, of a convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons and prescribing the destruction of such weapons. It may perhaps be said that we are proceeding in the wrong order, as agreement has still not been reached on the basic issue of simultaneous treatment of both chemical and biological weapons. We feel, however, that by now such good reasons have been offered and such wide support has been voiced for a more comprehensive solution that we must endeavour to follow that road.

6. The preambles to the two draft conventions before the Committee contain roughly the same elements; and it should not prove difficult to amalgamate them into a single text. When we do so, reference should be added, of course, to the important resolutions which were adopted by the United Nations General Assembly after the submission of those drafts, particularly resolution 2603 A (XXIV) (CCD/275) concerning the affirmation of the existing ban on the use of all chemical and biological agents of warfare, described in a modern definition.

7. When it comes to the main prohibitory provision we hold the view, which I have stated in earlier interventions, that it would not suffice, nor be meaningful from a verification point of view, to prohibit only the weapons, as end-products. The prohibition must be extended to the development, production and stockpiling of the active agents themselves. Any chemical and biological agent having no recognized application other than for warfare purposes should thus be unconditionally prohibited. For such agents as have recognized uses for peaceful purposes the prohibitory regulation would refer to the cases where they were specifically applied or intended to be applied for warfare purposes. All ancillary equipment or vectors specifically designed for using chemical or biological agents as agents of warfare would also have to be prohibited.

8. In our opinion there would have to be, in connexion with these prohibitory rules, as in the United Kingdom draft, a clearly-defined clause allowing for exceptions

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

for agents, equipment or vectors of types and in quantities that are justified for prophylaxis and therapy, for research on protective equipment and methods, or for use for riot control in accordance with national and international law.

9. We agree with the authors of the two draft conventions on the necessity of having a provision in which parties undertake not to assist, encourage or induce any State, group of States or international organization to develop, produce or otherwise acquire and stockpile the forbidden agents and equipment. We would also include language in which the parties undertake to destroy within a certain period or to divert to peaceful uses all stocks of agents and equipment prohibited under the main provision. Those rules would correspond to articles 3 and 2 respectively of the nine-Power draft and to article II (b) and (c) of the United Kingdom draft.

10. When we come to the provisions on verification, our suggestions differ in several respects from the proposals in the draft conventions before the Committee. I explained our basic considerations on this subject at some length in my statement on 9 April, to which I have already referred. Our ideas -- which could be put into language better adapted for use in a treaty text -- could be summarized as follows.

11. All parties would undertake the following series of obligations in order to prevent any diversion of chemical or biological agents from peaceful uses to agents of warfare and to ensure compliance with the prohibitions in the treaty.

12. The first one would be to facilitate and promote international exchange of information on pertinent peaceful, scientific, technical and other activities; and to co-operate to that end.

13. The second undertaking would consist of reporting to an agreed international organization -- the World Health Organization has been mentioned as a possible recipient -- and as determined by such organization, relevant data on these peaceful activities.

14. The third element would consist of an undertaking by each party not to provide, nor to permit any juridical or physical person within its territory or under its jurisdiction or control to provide, to any recipient chemical or biological agents that might be diverted from peaceful uses to agents of warfare, unless reported by the party to the responsible international organization. That provision would replace the contents of articles 4 and 5 of the nine-power draft convention; and it corresponds to the contents of article III, paragraph 2, of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*).

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

15. The fourth step in the verification process, as we perceive it, would consist of a provision whereby the parties would undertake to consult and co-operate with each other and with the responsible international organization in solving any problems which might arise in the application of the provisions of the convention, and to facilitate any inquiry or other suitable method of clarification that might be deemed necessary on the basis of the exchange of information or collection of reports mentioned earlier. That stage would correspond to the by now well-known idea of "verification by challenge", enabling a party to free itself of any suspicion of cheating. This provision can be said to be an elaboration of the proviso in the nine-power draft, contained in its article 6.
16. Our text would, further, contain a clause in order to ensure that the safeguards I have just outlined would be implemented in a manner which would avoid hampering the scientific, technical or economic development of the parties, or international co-operation in peaceful activities. That idea is taken from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which has a similar clause in its article III, paragraph 3.
17. The verification system could have as a final feature the right of any party which believed that actions of any other party constituted a breach of the obligations in the treaty to lodge a complaint with the Security Council. Such an idea is to be found in article III of the United Kingdom draft convention, and in the amendment to the nine-power draft convention put forward by the delegations of Hungary, Mongolia and Poland on 14 April of this year.
18. Regarding the more procedural parts of the nine-power draft convention, we have two amendments to suggest: the first enabling parties to propose amendments to the convention, and the second allowing for a review conference five years after the entry into force of the convention. For both ideas we propose that the language be borrowed from the corresponding provisions in the latest draft sea-bed treaty. We consider that such provisions have proved their value in other connexions and that they should therefore form part of all future arms-control agreements. A specific task of the review conference should be stressed: namely the necessity to take into account any relevant scientific and technical developments and to pay particular attention to changes in the recognition of the application of chemical and biological agents for warfare or for peaceful purposes, respectively, as that recognition would serve as a basis for the categories of prohibition which I mentioned earlier.

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

19. Coming to an end of this description of our suggested changes in and additions to the draft conventions, I want just to add that I fully understand and expect that other delegations may have other and better ideas. I have chiefly wanted by this description to start a process of more detailed negotiation, aimed at our arriving at a more definite treaty text which could, we would hope, be rather generally acceptable. We stand ready to discuss our ideas further, formally or informally. What is important, I think, is an accelerated pace of negotiations, enabling us to see clearly what agreement has already been achieved, what it is possible to achieve now, and where disagreement persists.

20. While our Committee has been at work on an internationally-binding convention on the renunciation of chemical and biological means of warfare, some important steps forward have been taken by different countries. I have already had occasion in an earlier statement (CCD/PV.463, para. 8) to comment on the great merits of President Nixon's unilateral pledges for the United States, inter alia to confine its biological research to defensive measures, such as immunization and safety, to prepare for the disposal of existing stocks of biological weapons, to renounce preparations for the use of toxins as a method of warfare, to confine its military programme for toxins to research for defensive purposes only, and to direct the destruction of all existing United States toxin weapons (CCD/PV.449, paras. 25 and 26) — and doing all that without waiting for the settlement of the questions of reciprocity or verification.

21. In statements to this Committee several declarations with a similar bearing have been made. The United Kingdom has said, inter alia, that it has never had any biological weapons, that it has none now, that it has no intention of acquiring any, and that its research in the field of biological warfare has always been confined to defensive measures (CCD/PV.462, para. 11). Canada has declared, inter alia, that it never has had and does not now possess any biological weapons -- or toxins -- and does not intend to develop, produce, acquire, stockpile or use such weapons at any time in the future; and -- this commitment does not cover tear gas and other crowd and riot control agents -- that it does not possess any chemical weapons and does not intend to develop, produce, acquire, stockpile or use such weapons at any time in the future unless those weapons should be used against the military forces or the civilian population of Canada or its allies (CCD/PV.460, para. 37).

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

22. The Netherlands has said that as long ago as 1930, when it ratified the Geneva Protocol, it was among the first countries to renounce unconditionally the use of bacteriological or biological weapons (CCD/PV.458, para. 22). I take it that this means the same as not having or intending to acquire such biological weapons. Otherwise, quite a number of countries, including my own, have ratified without any reservations the comprehensive Geneva Protocol (A/7575/Rev.1, annex VI) against the use in war of either biological or chemical weapons.

23. In my country we have recently stated explicitly that our position in regard to chemical and biological means of warfare is definitely a negative one concerning both their production and their use. On 29 April my Government in a message to Parliament on foreign policy declared the following:

"... the Government considers it important to call attention to the fact that Sweden does not possess, nor does it intend to manufacture, any biological or chemical means of warfare. Research work is being carried out to develop protective methods in the event of our country being attacked with such weapons. Such research work, for example in respect of vaccines, is of obvious importance also in peacetime, inter alia to develop protection for the population against various diseases."

24. I want to add that the systems of control which exist in many countries, as also in Sweden, in regard to the handling of materials such as drugs, pesticides, insecticides and poisons would seem adaptable to a future international control system. We also set great store by the principle of openness; and we are at present exploring the possibilities of adapting our procedures to any future international obligations.

25. Some members of our Committee have recently invited nations to follow this avenue of national renunciation. I have earlier welcomed such national decisions; but I have also stressed, and I want to stress again, that unilateral decisions can be no substitute for internationally-binding agreements. It is important that such voluntary undertakings should not be one-sided or result in an unbalanced situation. And it is, of course, preferable to arrive at a state of affairs in which we shall have an international treaty so that all renunciations will have the same and, we hold, maximum coverage.

26. I wish to end this statement by pointing out that I have not touched upon any of the recently-raised technical aspects of our work on treaty obligations because I hope we can continue that discussion at a new informal meeting of the Committee in the near future.

27. Mr. ESCHAUZIER (Netherlands): In my statement this morning I should like to make a few brief remarks on the third version of a draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed (CCD/269/Rev.2).
28. From the outset I would emphasize that the draft treaty deals with the subject of arms control. It therefore does not have either the intention or the scope to affect the environment in which the proposed measures of arms control are to be implemented. The treaty has to be interpreted in such a manner that its stipulations are not extended beyond the scope of its goals and objectives; otherwise there would be a clear case of détournement de droit.
29. The preceding reasons have been expressed several times by the co-authors of the draft treaty. Furthermore, it is clearly formulated in article IV of the draft treaty. It does not seem fruitful for this Committee to fight a battle which cannot properly be fought in this forum. That does not mean that it would not be preferable to avoid ambiguities, contradictions or vagueness. We are fully in support of drafting a clear and non-controversial text. However, in a process of negotiations there always comes a stage when positions have reached a certain maturity and finality. Efforts to introduce new changes at such a stage might jeopardize the whole treaty, or at least the momentum to finalize what has been agreed upon so far.
30. My second remark bears upon the evident self-restraint which is the background and origin of the co-authors' efforts to come to an agreement on the subject matter. The emplacement of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed is not a matter of science fiction but a real possibility. The self-restraint I have mentioned is of course motivated by the self-interest of the parties concerned. The merit of the draft treaty is, however, that the co-authors came to the conclusion that a prohibition as envisaged was in their mutual interest and that they were able to reach agreement on a formula containing such a prohibition. They could, of course, have concluded a bilateral agreement. They could even have laid down their understanding in a gentleman's agreement.
31. The co-authors of the draft treaty, however, followed a different course. They departed from the method adopted in concluding the test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1), which was agreed upon by the original parties but which was subsequently opened to all States for signature. The co-authors clearly followed the hard road of multilateral negotiations; and they have shown willingness to take into consideration the suggestions and proposals of many delegations. We have gone a long way since the Soviet Union and the United States of America submitted their original separate drafts. The Netherlands delegation looks upon this development in an appreciative way.

(Mr. Eschauzier, Netherlands)

32. The result of our joint efforts is not a perfect one. We certainly should think of a better text and a clearer formulation in certain respects. Our desire for perfection should not become self-defeating, however. From a political point of view it would be a worth-while achievement if we could present unanimously to the forthcoming session of the General Assembly, during which the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations will be celebrated, an agreed text for a sea-bed treaty. In those conditions it would be likely that the treaty would become open for signature by the end of this year, which is the first year of the proclaimed Disarmament Decade.

33. With regard to the imperfections and shortcomings of the draft treaty now before us, I should like also to underline the importance of the treaty provision concerning the review conference. During that conference — to take place in Geneva after five years — the operation of the treaty will be reviewed with a view to ensuring that the purposes of the preamble, including the third paragraph, and the provisions of the treaty are being achieved. That review conference would therefore provide us with an opportunity to reconsider the fulfilment as well as the scope of the treaty obligations.

34. I should like now to comment briefly on certain suggestions made by other delegations.

35. The representatives of Brazil (CCD/PV.473, para. 78) and Argentina (CCD/PV.475/Add.1, paras. 17 and 18) proposed to delete the words "including the freedoms of the high seas" in paragraph 1 of article III. My delegation would prefer to retain those words in the text. Our Brazilian colleague even questioned the sense of the whole first paragraph of article III. We do not believe that to be right. That first paragraph is the basis and starting-point of the whole verification article, to which so many countries attach such great importance. I noted that the Mexican representative too attached importance to that paragraph and to the inclusion of the words "including the freedoms of the high seas" (CCD/PV.477, para. 44).

36. The Brazilian representative (CCD/PV.473, paras. 80 and 81), supported by his colleague from Argentina (CCD/PV.475/Add.1, paras. 19-25), also proposed replacing the words "may participate" in the final sentence of paragraph 2 of article III by the expression "shall be ... entitled to participate". We are in sympathy with that proposal.

37. We have taken note of Mr. Roshchin's statement (CCD/PV.476, para. 67) in which he explained the Soviet objection to a reference in article III to "appropriate international procedures including the good offices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations." (A/C.1/992). As is well known, my delegation has expressed itself (CCD/PV.442, para. 23) in favour of incorporating an international element in the

(Mr. Eschauzier, Netherlands)

verification procedures of the sea-bed treaty. Therefore it regrets that the Canadian suggestion to that effect was not incorporated in the text of the draft treaty before the Committee. Nevertheless, together with several other delegations, we are of the opinion that this omission does not infringe the inherent right of any Member of the United Nations to seek the advice and assistance of the Secretary-General.

38. Finally, I want to express my sympathy with a suggestion made by the delegation of Yugoslavia (CCD/PV.473, para. 95) which proposed inter alia to incorporate in the text of the treaty a new stipulation according to which parties to the treaty would undertake to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations, with a view to his notifying all the signatories of the treaty, of the results of verification, if and when undertaken. In my view, such an undertaking should be restricted to the results of the further verification procedures mentioned in paragraphs 2 and 3 of article III. The proposed notification procedure would contribute to the knowledge of the technically less-advanced countries concerning verification techniques.

39. Mr. CASTANEDA (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): The Mexican delegation has submitted a working paper concerning a proposal to add to article VIII of the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed (CCD/269/Rev.2) the following second paragraph:

"2. The States parties to this treaty undertake not to contribute in any way to the commission in the zone referred to in article I, of acts involving a violation of such obligations." (CCD/294)

The draft additional provision is accompanied by a commentary summarizing the reasons and grounds for proposing it. There is therefore no need to explain those reasons at length in this statement, and I will merely say this.

40. Under the present wording of article VIII the provisions of the draft treaty are in no way to affect the obligations assumed by States parties under international instruments establishing zones free from nuclear weapons. Whereas article I entitles any coastal State to install nuclear weapons on the sea-bed or the ocean floor or in the subsoil thereof in an area corresponding to the twelve-mile belt of sea adjacent to its coast, the first paragraph of article VIII would invalidate that right where States parties have undertaken by other international instruments to ban nuclear weapons from their territories.

(Mr. Eschauzier, Netherlands)

41. However, it is necessary to add to that provision an undertaking by other States parties to the treaty not to contribute in any way to the commission in the twelve-mile zone referred to in article I of acts involving a violation of obligations laid down in international agreements by which nuclear weapons are banned from specified areas. The need, therefore, is to lay down corresponding obligations. If a certain number of States have undertaken not to possess nuclear weapons on their territories, it is right to ask other States to respect that undertaking by refraining from violating it. This obligation is passive: it is an obligation not to do something, and consists merely in accepting international commitments assumed by other States and in not encouraging their infraction.

42. This provision is based on principles of general international law, in particular on the principle of respect for the territorial integrity of all States and for the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/226*). The purpose of the Mexican proposal is to spell out in the context of the present treaty a general obligation based on international law.

43. Mr. PETROV (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): Permit me first of all to express my sincere thanks to the members of this Committee who have addressed kind words of welcome and congratulation to me on my appointment as head of the Bulgarian delegation. I am happy to participate in the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the principal body bound to contribute through disarmament to the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security. I am comparatively new to this field, and shall endeavour to study thoroughly all its complex problems, to co-operate sincerely with all the other members of the Committee, and to make my modest contribution to the noble cause of disarmament. I am happy to join my efforts to those of other representatives now that new measures aimed at broadening international agreement on disarmament are being worked out.

44. I should like to submit today, on behalf of the Bulgarian delegation, some observations on one of these measures upon which I believe the Committee ought to concentrate its efforts in the near future: namely the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. This question has been debated at length in our Committee; and we are convinced that the prerequisite conditions now exist to enable the Committee to submit to the next session of the General Assembly a draft treaty likely to gain its approval.

(Mr. Petrov, Bulgaria)

45. The Bulgarian delegation would like to say at once that it associates itself with all delegations which have supported the last revision of the joint draft of the co-Chairmen of this Conference (CCD/269/Rev.2). We have devoted our full attention to the study of this document and of the observations which other delegations have made upon it. Allow me to express the gratitude of the Bulgarian delegation to the co-Chairmen for their efforts in accomplishing this arduous task and for their care in dealing with the suggestions made by other delegations.

46. The draft treaty has been examined with the greatest care both by our Committee during three sessions and by the General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session; and from all these discussions it has emerged clearly improved. In its present form it has become in very large measure the joint work of the whole Committee. The speakers who have preceded me have analysed very clearly and thoroughly the many important amendments made to the draft. I do not propose to study them myself in detail, but would merely submit some general observations on the principal provisions of the draft.

47. The provisions of articles I and II concerning the purpose and scope of the intended prohibition have been made clearer; and that is a source of satisfaction to us. The wording of article II does not in our view raise any difficulty with regard to the field of application of the treaty, and its interpretation leaves no room for ambiguity.

48. A number of amendments have been made to article III, which now spells out in greater detail the principle of the proposed system of control and verification -- that is to say, recognition of the right of States parties to the treaty to undertake procedures of observation, verification and control in order to ensure respect for its restrictive and prohibitive clauses. Furthermore, the right given by paragraph 5 of article III to each State party to undertake verifications "using its own means, or with the full or partial assistance of any other State party", and the right to apply to the Security Council, leave no doubt of the effectiveness of the guarantees concerning the rights of States parties.

49. These rights are also guaranteed by article IV, the provisions of which suffice to dispel any fear that the treaty may prejudice the rights -- or even the claims -- which a State party -

"... may assert ... related to waters off its coast; including inter alia territorial seas and contiguous zones, or to the sea-bed and the ocean floor, including continental shelves."

(Mr. Petrov, Bulgaria)

50. The draft also leaves room, in its articles V and VI, for amendment of its provisions if the situation changes in the future.

51. The Bulgarian delegation is convinced that the main purpose of the prohibition whose procedure we are now discussing is to stimulate the search for suitable means of strengthening international peace and security. We think that the draft treaty, by the very nature of the prohibition it proposes, meets the hopes which the General Assembly had expressed in resolution 2602 F (XXIV):

"... the prevention of a nuclear arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor serves the interests of maintaining world peace, reducing international tensions and strengthening friendly relations among States" (CCD/275).

52. The prohibition against emplacing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor will have the effect not only of preserving that vast region of the globe from the race in nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, but also of preventing progress in the technical and scientific revolution from being applied to the improvement of weapons of this kind or the invention of new ones expressly for use on the sea-bed and ocean floor. It would help greatly to make the international atmosphere more wholesome, and would create new conditions favourable to the process of disarmament. Nearly all States agree that this is true. Only a few days ago the representative of Morocco, Mr. Khattabi, pointed this out very clearly, when he said:

"... Morocco ... attaches great importance to the speedy conclusion of a treaty excluding the sea-bed from the nuclear arms race, as a first step towards the more complete demilitarization of that environment, so necessary to the survival and well-being of humanity." (CCD/PV.477, para. 65)

53. Moreover, without wishing in any way to impugn the sincerity and good will of certain delegations, we find it difficult to understand their doubts of the political, economic and military value and need of an agreement of this type for all countries.

54. Another suggestion made during our debates has held my delegation's attention: that the Secretary-General of the United Nations, its highest official, might play a part in the system of verification and control provided in the draft: that a kind of international machinery should be based on his good offices. According to the suggestions, in the event of suspicious activities this machinery would undertake with its own technical, administrative and specialized means operations of verification, inspection and the like on the sea-bed and ocean floor. But would that path lead us

(Mr. Petrov, Bulgaria)

towards a positive result, or would it create new complications? Would the establishment of such machinery, based on recourse to the good offices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, not create serious technical, financial and even political difficulties? Political complications and misunderstandings could prevent the treaty from working properly. The real risks of this proposal were set forth unequivocally by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Roshchin, in his statement of 7 July (CCD/PV.476, paras. 62 et seq.). In view of the possible difficulties, it might be wiser to endeavour to find another solution better suited to our aim.

55. The Bulgarian delegation is not opposed to the idea of recourse to an international body or institution if other means fail to dispel doubts of the fulfilment of obligations. On the contrary, we think we should advocate the most appropriate body. We are convinced that in the present case that body would be the Security Council; and we therefore support without reservation the provision in paragraph 4 of article III of the draft allowing recourse to the Council, since the main purpose of the proposed treaty is the nuclear disarmament of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and since nuclear disarmament is one of the most important factors, if not the most important factor, in the establishment of a system of international security. The Security Council is the body empowered to make recommendations or take decisions concerning measures for maintaining or re-establishing peace: that is spelt out clearly and precisely in Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. Hence, by including the Security Council in the verification and control system, we entrust to the United Nations a vital part in the application of the treaty.

56. We are firmly convinced that the system provided in the draft and based on observation, consultation, co-operation, inquiry, assistance from other States parties, inspection and recourse to the Security Council is an entirely appropriate international system which would effectively apply the prohibition and effectively protect the rights of States against any violation.

57. The Bulgarian delegation would like also to say a few words on another idea which has been presented here: that of linking demilitarization of the sea-bed and ocean floor to the establishment of an international system regulating their peaceful uses. Such an attempt by our Committee would only divert our attention from the serious problems before us and make us intervene in the affairs of other international bodies.

(Mr. Petrov, Bulgaria)

We do not think the Committee on Disarmament is competent to deal with the peaceful use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor; that task is now being handled by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and any trespassing would hinder the work of both Committees.

58. The Bulgarian delegation fully supports the principles contained in the draft treaty but on condition that it shall be the foundation and beginning of the complete prohibition of the use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor for military purposes. We are satisfied that it expresses the resolve of the States parties to take steps in that direction, and we hope that these will be taken without delay. It is with that intention that we would support the Polish proposal to retain the question of the demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor on the Committee's agenda (CCD/PV.471, para. 9).

59. In conclusion I should like to say that a treaty prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor would be a new measure limiting the use of those weapons, would meet the needs and interests of the international community, and would be a step forward towards general and complete disarmament. Its conclusion would, apart from its particular practical objects, also prove highly important for the present political atmosphere. We are certain, therefore, that an agreement laying down that prohibition will be adopted by the great majority of States.

60. Mr. HOLLIST (Nigeria): Allow me first, on behalf of my delegation, to take this opportunity to associate ourselves with the welcome that previous speakers in this Committee have extended to the newly-appointed heads of delegations, Ambassador Tanaka of Japan and Ambassador Petrov of Bulgaria, who have joined this Committee for the first time at this session, and to welcome back among us you yourself, Mr. Chairman, Ambassador Castañeda of Mexico, Ambassador Erdembileg of Mongolia and Ambassador El Fassi of Morocco, who have resumed participation in the work of our Committee.

61. I propose to speak today on the revised draft sea-bed treaty which the co-Chairmen jointly presented to this Committee on 23 April (CCD/269/Rev.2). When the first draft of the treaty (CCD/269) was presented by the co-Chairmen in October 1969, the Nigerian delegation congratulated them on the spirit of co-operation and the desire for some measure of progress in disarmament which were evinced by their presentation of the joint draft (CCD/PV.445, para. 140). I wish to reiterate our congratulations with regard to the revised version that we now have before us. By revising their initial

(Mr. Hollist, Nigeria)

draft to conform largely with the views that were expressed both in this Committee and at the last session of the General Assembly, the co-Chairmen have once again demonstrated their awareness of the need to make progress, however marginal, in disarming, or rather in limiting the scope of armament, if humanity as we know it today is not to be annihilated by the colossal build-up of weapons of mass destruction.

62. In that connexion we are glad that the revised draft has taken cognisance of the Argentine amendments to articles I and II (A/C.1/997); has up to a point accepted the Canadian amendment on verification (A/C.1/992; CCD/270), endorsed by all the developing and non-aligned States represented in this Committee; and has endorsed the Mexican amendment recognizing the continuing obligation, in spite of the proposed treaty, assumed by "States parties to the treaty under international instruments establishing zones free from nuclear weapons" (A/C.1/995).

63. Having acclaimed the amendments to the original draft, I am not by any means suggesting that the revised draft meets all expectations. It is true that a negotiated international agreement cannot at its formulation, as stated by the representative of Czechoslovakia, "fully and perfectly meet all suggestions and views" (CCD/PV.476, para. 20); but, be that as it may, the fact remains that in order to ensure wide acceptance an international agreement must be clear in its prescriptions and be seen to protect the interests of all as much as possible. It is therefore with that objective in view that I shall now proceed to present the comments of the Nigerian delegation on the revised draft sea-bed treaty.

64. Last year the Nigerian delegation, along with the majority of the members of this Committee, declared in unmistakable terms its preference for a treaty which would completely demilitarize the sea-bed. Although we have never been convinced by the arguments that have been adduced against such a treaty, we have nevertheless agreed in a spirit of co-operation to accept a limited-prohibition treaty on the understanding that it was regarded as no more than a step towards the ultimate objective of complete demilitarization of the sea-bed. That is why the Nigerian delegation regrets that the co-Chairmen have not found it possible to accept the Swedish proposal (CCD/271) regarding the incorporation in the substantive provisions of the treaty of a pledge to pursue negotiations on a more comprehensive prohibition of the use of the sea-bed for military purposes. We appreciate, of course, that the third paragraph of the preamble, when read in conjunction with

(Mr. Hollist, Nigeria)

article VI, leaves the door open for further negotiations on the demilitarization of the sea-bed; but we share the view of the overwhelming majority of this Committee that the Swedish amendment should nevertheless be incorporated in the treaty; particularly since every delegation here, as far as we can see, agrees in principle that prospects for further negotiations relating to the sea-bed should not be foreclosed.

65. The Nigerian delegation also supports the suggestion made by Mr. Zybylski on behalf of the Polish delegation that this Committee should keep on its agenda the question of the demilitarization of the sea-bed (CCD/PV.471, para. 9).

66. My delegation congratulates Mr. Castañeda of Mexico on his illuminating exposé at our meeting on 9 July (CCD/IV.477). My delegation is in full agreement with him that the text of articles I and II, particularly, need to be redrafted in clearer legal language to remove the confusion which now characterizes them (*ibid.*, paras. 23 *et seq.*). However, we are unable to accept his contention that the phrase "the sea-bed beneath its territorial waters" at the end of article I, paragraph 2, may be construed to confer additional rights on coastal States which claim territorial waters of more than the twelve-mile limit (*ibid.*, paras. 34 *et seq.*). It may well be that the phrase is superfluous; but it certainly does not authorize any State, whatever the breadth of the territorial waters it claims, to implant or emplace weapons of mass destruction beyond the twelve-mile limit permitted by the treaty. The phrase "the sea-bed beneath its territorial waters" should be read in conjunction with a preceding phrase in the same article I, paragraph 2: "within such sea-bed zone". That phrase, I think, sets the limit to the maximum breadth of territorial waters exempted from the prohibition of the treaty. Article I, paragraph 1, and article II between them define the sea-bed zone as twelve miles. Article I, paragraph 2, can only mean, therefore, that within that twelve-mile zone -- and I emphasize the word "within" -- the prohibition of the treaty shall not apply to the sea-bed beneath territorial waters.

67. We are glad to note that in the revised draft treaty the co-Chairmen have incorporated substantially the Canadian proposals relating to verification and control. Unfortunately, however, they have omitted from the Canadian formulation as contained in document A/C.1/992 the provisions for recourse to international procedures or the good offices of the Secretary-General. We have listened attentively to the arguments that have been levelled against those provisions, but we are not convinced that their elimination is justified.

(Mr. Hollist, Nigeria)

68. As Mr. Ignatieff rightly pointed out in his statement on 25 June, the establishment of appropriate international procedures does not necessarily imply "the establishment of some new, elaborate and expensive international machinery" (CCD/PV.473, para. 5). Similarly, we do not consider that recourse to the good offices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations creates any power as such for him. In fact, the need for some international procedure has, I think, been underlined by the question asked by the representative of Yugoslavia, Mr. Bozinovic, in his statement on 25 June. Referring to the provision in article III that parties in the region of the suspected activities, and any other party so requesting, shall be notified of, and may participate in, the verification procedure, Mr Bozinovic asked:

"... how will the parties [in the region] know that such activities are going on, and thus be able to express their desire to take part in consultation and co-operation?" (ibid., para. 96)

That is indeed a pertinent question, which I hope the co-Chairmen will answer.

69. In our opinion the draft treaty relies too heavily on the Security Council for control. The right of recourse to the Security Council is guaranteed by the United Nations Charter and is therefore available to every Member independently of the sea-bed treaty. In any case, while we do not undervalue the Security Council, we are sceptical about whether the Council as now constituted should be accorded a specific role in this treaty, as is done in article III, paragraph 4, and article VII. We feel that such a role for the Security Council is bound to be controversial in the long run; since the position of the Council under the United Nations Charter appears hardly compatible with the exercise of arbitration functions provided for under a substantive international treaty, like the one under discussion, to which countries may adhere independently of their membership of the United Nations.

70. Mr. ZELLEKE (Ethiopia): Having listened carefully to the many important comments made by members of this Committee on the revised draft treaty on the sea-bed (CCD/269/Rev.2), I should like today to give briefly the point of view of the Ethiopian delegation.

71. Looking at it in retrospect, one would think that the treaty could have been completed at the last session of the General Assembly and that this Committee could have moved on to the consideration of other concrete measures of disarmament which have been before the Committee for a long time. Nevertheless, continuous discussions

(Mr. Zelleke, Ethiopia)

and exchanges of view on the draft have no doubt contributed to the clarification of the complicated nature of the sea-bed treaty and led the Committee towards a common understanding.

72. It is a recognized fact that the new revised draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, presented formally by the delegations of the USSR and the United States on 23 April (CCD/PV.467), has gone a long way to meet the requirements expressed in various comments and suggestions made both here in the Committee and in the General Assembly. The changes incorporated in the new draft are numerous and substantial. My delegation welcomes those changes for the better, and joins others in congratulating the co-Chairmen on their unceasing efforts and spirit of compromise, which have led to the presentation of a much clearer draft, which deserves a wider range of acceptance.

73. Once again, however, and in spite of the repeated appeals of several members of the Committee, the co-Chairmen have been unable, regrettably, to include in a separate article in the body of the draft treaty a provision for the continuance of further negotiations completely to demilitarize the sea-bed. It will be recalled that, when the question of disarmament measures for the sea-bed was first raised in this Committee by the delegation of the Soviet Union in the form of a draft treaty (ENDC/240), my delegation was among those which supported the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed (ENDC/PV.402, para. 98). However, in deference to the various arguments advanced in this Committee and in the light of the existing political realities, it became unavoidable to go along with the partial measures of mere denuclearization of the sea-bed, as proposed in the present draft, on the understanding, of course, that the treaty would contain a provision for the continuance of negotiations for complete demilitarization of the sea-bed in much the same way as is done in article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*). It was in that spirit that a large majority of States welcomed and supported the provision contained in the Swedish working paper (CCD/271) calling for the continuance of negotiations in good faith on the comprehensive prohibition of the use for military purposes of the sea-bed.

74. Without going any further into the arguments which have been presented emphatically by other delegations in favour of the inclusion in the draft of a separate article on the lines suggested in the Swedish working paper, my delegation hopes that the

(Mr. Zelleke, Ethiopia)

co-Chairmen will be able to reconsider their position in the light of the desire of the large majority of States progressively to prohibit the use of the sea-bed for military purposes.

75. As far as the new changes are concerned, in the past few weeks, since the beginning of our second session this year, several delegations have referred to and analysed in detail the new changes which appear in the revised draft. My delegation wishes to note that, among other things, articles I and II taken together with the disclaimer clause, article IV, and the authoritative interpretations given by the authors when introducing the revised draft treaty have satisfactorily demarcated the areas of prohibition and successfully solved the question of the maritime zone.

76. Considerable improvements have been achieved also with regard to the verification issue as it now appears in article III. This is due mainly to the inclusion in the draft of the suggestions made in the Canadian working paper (A/C.1/992; CCD/270), to which the Ethiopian delegation gave full support. In this particular case, however, my delegation, like many others, cannot fail to note the omission from the article of an arrangement for international verification machinery within or outside the United Nations system.

77. My delegation has already stated (CCD/PV.444, para. 131) that, for the vast majority of developing nations, verification by their own means would remain a theoretical possibility without any practical significance, as it is well known that those countries are far behind the technological standard that would be required for verification activities on the sea-bed. In our opinion, therefore, it is indispensable that those States should look to external assistance in verification. While we welcome, in this respect, the provision for bilateral assistance in verification as stipulated in paragraph 5 of article III, we fail to understand why any State should be deprived of any assistance in verification from a multilateral source when such an arrangement becomes feasible. We hope that the co-Chairmen will find appropriate wording which will not exclude future verification through an international arrangement, if and when such an arrangement becomes feasible.

78. Finally, I should like to welcome the addition of article VI dealing with the matter of the review of the operation of the treaty. My delegation has always maintained that the present draft treaty is designed to deal with an environment little known to modern technology. That is why we feel that a periodic review of the operation of the treaty will be essential in order to improve it, if need be, in the light of the better knowledge of the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof.

(Mr. Zelleke, Ethiopia)

79. In conclusion, this Committee can now reasonably hope to be able to present to the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly a broadly-agreed draft treaty on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. The new draft has already solved a number of difficult and basic issues. In view of the co-operation and spirit of compromise which the co-Chairmen have already shown, we expect that certain changes will be forthcoming to accommodate the various points raised during our discussion at the present session.

80. The CHAIRMAN (Yugoslavia): I shall now read an announcement on behalf of the co-Chairmen:

"The delegation of Canada has requested that an informal meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament be held on Wednesday, 12 August, to discuss the question of the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons. If agreeable to the other members of the Committee, this meeting will be held at 10.30 a.m. on 12 August."

81. If there are no observations, it will be so decided.

It was so decided.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 480th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Anton Vratasa, representative of Yugoslavia.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Sweden, the Netherlands, Mexico, Bulgaria, Nigeria and Ethiopia.

"The delegation of Mexico submitted a working paper on the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof (CCD/294).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 23 July 1970, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12 noon

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/PV.481
23 July 1970
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FIRST MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 23 July 1970, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. C. ORTIZ de ROZAS

(Argentina)

(Previous verbatim records in this series appeared under the symbols
ENDC/PV.1-ENDC/PV.430).

GE.70-16290
70-35476

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Argentina:

Mr. C. ORTIZ de ROZAS
Mr. A.F. DUMONT
Mr. V.E. BERASATEGUI
Mr. M.E. DELPECH

Brazil:

Mr. R.E. SARAIVA GUERREIRO
Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA

Bulgaria:

Mr. T. PETROV
Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV

Burma:

U KYAW MIN

Canada:

Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
Mr. I. HEAD
Mr. R.W. CLARK
Mr. R.E. MOORE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. J. STRUCKA

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Mr. G. ALEMU

Hungary:

Mr. J. PETRAN
Mr. I. SARKADI
Mr. F. GAJDA

India:

Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. R. CARACCILO
Mr. F.L. OTTIERI
Mr. R. BORSARELLI
Mr. U. PESTALOZZA

Japan:

Mr. H. TANAKA
Mr. H. OTSUKA
Mr. T. SENGOKU
Mr. J. SAKAMOTO

Mexico:

Mr. J. CASTANEDA
Mr. B. SEPULVEDA
Mr. R. VALERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDENBILEG
Mr. Z. ERENDO
Mrs. D. BALJINNYAM

Morocco:

Mr. M.A.A. KHATTABI
Mr. A. BENKIRANE

Netherlands:

Mr. H.F. ESCHAUZIER
Mr. E. BOS

Nigeria:

Mr. C.O. HOLLIST
Mr. L.A. MALIKI

Pakistan:

Mr. K. AHMED
Mr. S.A.D. BUKHARI
Mr. T.O. HYDER

Poland:

Mr. W. NATORF
Mr. K. ZYBYLSKI
Mr. H. STEPOSZ

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU
Mr. N. CHILIE

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Mr. A. EDELSTAM
Mr. O. DAHLEN
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. I.I. TCHEPROV
Mr. L.A. MASTERKOV
Mr. Y.C. NAZARKINE

United Arab Republic:

Mr. O. SIRRY
Mr. M. ISMAIL

United Kingdom:

Mr. I.F. PORTER
Mr. J.T. MASEFIELD
Mr. R. HOULISTON
Mr. L.W. BOYES

United States of America:

Mr. J.F. LEONARD
Mr. A.F. NEIDLE
Mr. W. GIVAN
Mr. R.L. McCORMACK

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. BOZINOVIC
Mr. M. VUKOVIC

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): I declare open the 481st plenary meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.
2. Mr. CASTANEDA (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): It is my intention on this occasion to make some comments on chemical and bacteriological weapons. In previous statements, both here and in the General Assembly, the delegation of Mexico has expressed its views on those weapons of mass destruction. However, certain developments have taken place recently to which we should now like to refer. It goes without saying that our anxiety is increased by the dangerous slowness of the process of negotiation, despite the obvious need to reach an agreement on this subject and the urgent request addressed to us by the General Assembly.
3. We now have new and better evidence on which to establish our positions. Many important suggestions have been made by various delegations during our discussions; and various institutions whose repute and authority cannot be questioned have produced well-documented and instructive studies. We ourselves continue to regard the report prepared by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons (A/7575/Rev.1) as the essential background against which to order our ideas on this question. We also have the report of the World Health Organization on the general health aspects of chemical and biological agents^{1/}, which has confirmed the conclusions of the group of experts convened by the Secretary-General. Thirdly, we have the highly-authoritative and conscientious studies published by the Stockholm International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research (SIIRI), which are especially valuable and useful in regard to the methods of verification and control that might be used for guaranteeing compliance with obligations.
4. This valuable material has consolidated and strengthened some of our original judgements, and has given us a new frame for reflection. An initial conclusion would be that prohibition of the use of such weapons is urgent and hence calls for a solution within a very short time. In the debates which took place last spring in the Committee on Disarmament, the view was expressed that in certain respects this subject is perhaps the most important on our agenda. It might rightly be maintained that such weapons constitute an even greater danger than nuclear weapons. These, because

1/ Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Report of a WHO Group of Consultants, Geneva, 1970.

(Mr. Castañeda, Mexico)

of their very high cost, are available to only a very few great Powers, whereas chemical and biological weapons can be manufactured by a relatively large number of medium-sized or even small countries. They are, in a sense, the mass-destruction weapons of the poor. It is not that we think -- far from it -- that the great Powers, because they are great Powers, are more cautious and conduct their international relations with a greater sense of responsibility than the small Powers. We do believe, however, that any proliferation of these weapons is in itself a factor that undermines international relations and endangers peace. In any event there appears to be a broad consensus that the discussion is now ripe enough to let us reasonably expect a rapid solution.

5. The recent resolutions of the General Assembly constitute an important step forward. It will be recalled that last year, here in Geneva, extensive debates took place on the precise value and meaning of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 (A/7575/Rev.1, annex VI). The twelve non-aligned countries upheld the view that the use of chemical and biological weapons was formally prohibited and that the prohibition had for some time been an integral part of the generally-recognized rules of international law. None the less, we were aware also that a declaration by the General Assembly, as a highly representative body of the international community, concerning the scope and meaning of the prohibition contained in the 1925 Protocol would have great political and legal significance and would reinforce our judgement.

6. Subsequent developments confirmed that opinion. The discussions in the General Assembly were highly constructive and enlightening. Its resulting resolution (2603 A (XIV), CCD/275) condemned, and declared contrary to international law, the use of any chemical or biological agents of warfare and of substances, living organisms or infective material derived from either category.

7. Permit me to recall the statement made at the beginning of the spring session by the head of the Mexican delegation, Mr. García Robles, in commenting on that all-important resolution of the General Assembly:

"My delegation ventures to hope that the Committee may take that solemn declaration as a starting-point for its work in this field, since to do otherwise would imply disregard of what the General Assembly has rightly called 'the generally recognized rules of international law' and would hence be a deplorable step backwards." (CCD/PV.449, para. 78)

(Mr. Castañeda, Mexico)

8. We are gratified at the announcement made by the representative of Japan, Mr. Tanaka, that his country had ratified the Geneva Protocol of 1925 without attaching any reservation (CCD/PV.471, para 30). We hope to hear similar encouraging announcements from countries that have not yet signed the Protocol or have formulated reservations that limit it excessively. It is satisfactory also to learn that other countries have been taking the necessary measures to make an announcement similar to that which the Minister of External Relations of Brazil made a few days ago (CCD/PV.477, para. 15). We hope that in the very near future the Geneva Protocol will become an instrument with universal adherence.

9. The questions relating to the signature or ratification of the Protocol are one aspect of the problem before us. The other, of course, consists of the draft conventions submitted for our consideration and discussion by the delegations of the United Kingdom (ENDC/255/Rev.1) and of nine socialist countries (A/7655). The object of those two drafts is to supplement the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol by adopting provisions designed to prevent not only the use in war but also the production, acquisition and stockpiling of these weapons, and to ensure the destruction of existing stockpiles. The two drafts, of course, differ in the scope of their prohibition, the draft of the nine socialist States encompassing both chemical and bacteriological weapons, the United Kingdom draft only the latter.

10. Naturally, considerable efforts have since been made to improve both those drafts. It is very encouraging that the partisans of each draft have noted the criticisms of other States and attempted to strengthen its weak or doubtful points. Thus the United Kingdom delegation last year submitted a new article taken mutatis mutandis from the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*) and including in the operative part an obligation to pursue negotiations concerning weapons not so far covered. It likewise amended article I to dispel any fear that the future treaty might affect obligations assumed earlier by parties in accordance with the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

11. The same can be said of the steps taken by the United States delegation. Mr. Leonard's recent statement (CCD/PV.474, paras. 16 et seq.) that his country's Government regarded toxins as an integral part of the prohibitions laid down in the treaty are definitely encouraging. That addition considerably increases the value of the United Kingdom draft.

(Mr. Castañeda, Mexico)

12. On the other side, the delegations of Poland, Hungary and Mongolia have proposed (CCD/285 and Corr.1) amendments to the draft treaty of the nine socialist countries designed to increase United Nations participation in the verification machinery and generally to strengthen this.

13. In view of all those new facts we feel it necessary to explain our position in accordance with the criterion expressed in this Committee by the head of my delegation, Mr. García Robles: that, while our delegation prefers a more general approach, it "is prepared to do all it can to achieve a solution satisfactory to all."

(CCD/FV.449, para. 80)

14. We are very sensitive to the explanations given by those delegations which favour separate treatment for chemical and for biological weapons. In particular, as the United States delegation has pointed out, the very difficult verification procedures constitute the main stumbling-block. Similarly, the reasons invoked for giving our deliberations what has been called a "practical approach" are another factor that deserves to be carefully weighed.

15. We still believe that the undoubted difficulties of tackling both problems simultaneously are not entirely insurmountable. Perhaps those who propose that the subject should be divided start from the assumption that a clear and precise distinction can be drawn between chemical and biological weapons. In this Committee the more complex characteristics of the former have been insistently urged as the supreme argument for dissociating the two problems. Nevertheless, we are still in favour of the more comprehensive approach: the joint consideration of a problem which to our mind can hardly be divided. In point of fact we share the view of those delegations which have pointed out that the essential feature of both types of weapons is mass destruction. Because of their effects and their scope, both follow a similar line affecting the normal course of nature and life; both are capable of destroying the ecological environment in which we live.

16. We still doubt the soundness of separating these two weapons, since there is ample evidence that various types of agents are classed by some experts as biological and by others, equally competent and qualified, as chemical. Furthermore, the dividing line between the two is so delicate and fine that it sometimes becomes imperceptible. Moreover, new methods of chemical and biological warfare are constantly being discovered. As the Secretary-General's report truly says --

(Mr. Castañeda, Mexico)

"All biological processes depend upon chemical or physico-chemical reactions, and what may be regarded today as a biological agent could, tomorrow, as knowledge advances, be treated as chemical."

(A/7575/Rev.1, para. 19)

17. Thus we do not believe that the difference in nature between the two kinds of weapons is a valid reason for dealing with them separately. Moreover, the doubt occurs to us that to divide the problem may, despite the more or less vague compromise formulas that have been proposed, have the untoward effect of indefinitely postponing the preparation of a draft on chemical weapons. Experience shows clearly that, far from clearing the road to a second agreement, the crystallization of positions and the consolidation of vested interests -- as nearly always happens -- are more likely to block it. Consequently we believe that the unquestionable minor disadvantages of tackling these two problems together are less than the enormous dangers of tackling them separately.

18. I should now like to make a few brief remarks on the problem of verification and control. Our initial impression that manufacture of the kind of weapons we have in mind was so simple that even a garage or a kitchen could be used as a laboratory has to some extent been dispelled. On that point the World Health Organization's study has been especially enlightening. But the study itself suggests that in the last analysis the question is only one of nuance or, at most, of degree. The undeniable fact is that production of those weapons is relatively simple and inexpensive. Essentially, therefore, it is practically impossible to conceive of a direct control system based on international means and instruments.

19. Recognition of that truth, however, in no way means acceptance of the opposite view that chemical weapons cannot therefore be prohibited by international agreement. Pushed to the extreme, that reasoning could be applied to all disarmament measures, since control over any of them would be far from easy. In actual fact, any industrial installation capable of contributing to the manufacture of any kind of weapons could be built and concealed inside a mountain -- except possibly a gaseous diffusion plant. The fact that such installations cannot be controlled through visual observation is certainly not a reason for our resigning ourselves to never reaching an agreement on disarmament.

20. What happens is that, as the Swedish working paper (CCD/287) points out and the Swedish representative, Mrs. Myrdal, repeated on 14 July, a single verification method is rarely enough and a combination of mutually-reinforcing methods often has to be used

(Mr. Castañeda, Mexico)

For chemical and biological weapons a system of verification by challenge would be particularly appropriate -- that is, in the words of the Swedish representative --

"... voluntary decision by a party under suspicion of having violated a certain engagement to free itself through the supply of relevant information, not excluding invitation to inspection by an outside party or organ."

(CCD/PV.478, para. 51)

21. We are convinced that a combination of national and international methods culminating in action by the Security Council would provide reasonable guarantees -- not absolute certainty, since that is impossible, but reasonable guarantees -- that the treaty would not be violated. Control over a disarmament agreement is an equation containing three terms. First, reasonable measures of surveillance; second, tolerable risks; and third, a modicum of confidence in the other party's good faith and in its will to comply with its obligations. That confidence does not imply, of course, absolute faith that other States will be morally incapable of violating their undertakings -- certainly very few countries, if any, inspire that kind of faith. Rather it implies the belief that the price of discovery -- the loss of prestige and the other party's consequent exemption -- would be too high politically, and that the well-understood interest of each State counsels compliance with its obligations.

22. In any event, surveillance of the prohibition of biological and of chemical weapons presents similar difficulties; yet the partisans of the partial solution consider that the methods of control proposed for this purpose are sufficient. For our part, since last year we have been emphasizing the merits of the United Kingdom draft's control and surveillance provisions; we merely believe that they are equally applicable to chemical weapons.

23. The United Kingdom draft has the virtue of outlining an original and practical scheme which, though not perfect, will perhaps in the long run prove the most acceptable and adequate. It provides machinery by which a party believing that means of warfare banned by the convention have been used against it may submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations an accusation accompanied by all the available supporting evidence. The Secretary-General would be permanently empowered by the Security Council both to investigate complaints and to draw up reports on the results of his investigation. Suspicions that a State had violated other obligations, such as the prohibition of manufacture or stockpiling of biological weapons, could be referred directly to the Security Council.

24. The amendments proposed by Hungary, Mongolia and Poland to the draft treaty of the nine socialist States also strengthen the function of the Security Council. To our mind they too deserve careful consideration.

(Mr. Castañeda, Mexico)

25. These systems of complaint and accusation have the specific feature that they allow and even require some active participation by the individual as such. So far he has been confined to a clearly passive function in matters which obviously affect and particularly concern him. However, we believe that he could participate actively in denunciation of a breach of the provisions of a disarmament treaty. Moreover, the type of weapon involved makes it necessary that he should. But what is truly important is that for the first time he would become an authentic agent of disarmament and hence a genuine champion of the supreme interests of the international community. He would also fulfil a direct function in the search for peace.

26. By way of example, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Poland drew our attention in his statement of 14 April to the need for a precise indication in school and university textbooks of biology and chemistry that the use of any chemical or biological formula for military purposes constitutes a violation of international law and will be prosecuted in accordance with the appropriate national legislation.

Mr. Winiewicz reminded us that --

"Every individual must become aware of the danger represented by chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and must be prepared for some form of participation in the enforcement of the convention prohibiting the development and production of those inhuman means of warfare."

(CCD/PV.464, para. 32)

We could not agree more fully with those observations.

27. Naturally, the minimal security guarantees that the parties will comply strictly with their obligations do not end there. The idea to which I referred a few moments ago is no more than the first step and the support on which verification must perforce rest.

28. Concerning other forms of national control, several constructive suggestions have been made and might be considered. In particular, the Yugoslav delegation has described in detail some measures designed to place under the civil administration, and particularly under the ministries of health, of all States the institutions dealing with research on chemical and bacteriological weapons and their development and manufacture (CCD/PV.456, para. 35).

29. In spite of the progress made in the negotiations, we are still very far from achieving even a moderate consensus on the preparation of a convention. A favourable circumstance appeared last spring when many delegations interpreted as a promising

(Mr. Castañeda, Mexico)

sign the statement by the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, that his delegation was ready to fall in with the wish of the majority in this Committee (CCD/PV.462, para. 6). Unfortunately that encouraging prospect seems recently to have somewhat faded.

30. While the possibility of an agreement encompassing both chemical and bacteriological weapons recedes, the danger grows that untimely advances in technology will permit the use of biological weapons without risk to the users. Apparently today these weapons can hardly be used because of that risk; but the situation could change radically in a short time. Thus, it is asserted, the Committee ought to agree forthwith on the prohibition of biological weapons without awaiting the conclusion of a more difficult and thus more remote agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons. That is the weightiest argument adduced in favour of a separate and immediate treaty on biological weapons. I must confess that it has not failed to impress me.

31. We believe that that danger could be prevented without the enormous difficulties, to which I have referred, which the division of this subject would entail. The use of biological weapons could be legally prevented by other means in spite of technological progress, while an agreement embracing both chemical and biological weapons is being negotiated. We believe that to be possible.

32. The President of the United States announced in his statements of 25 November 1969 and 15 February this year the resolve of his Government to renounce all offensive biological weapons and lethal toxins; at the same time he confirmed his Government's decision not to be the first to utilize lethal chemical weapons, including incapacitating chemical agents; and lastly he pledged the elimination of the existing stockpiles of bacteriological weapons (CCD/PV.449, paras. 25, 26). Mrs. Myrdal, in her last statement, mentioned other unilateral declarations by several other countries along similar or identical lines (CCD/PV.480, paras. 20 et seq.).

33. It is superfluous to say that those announcements were received and welcomed with deep gratification by the international community. I have ventured to recall these important unilateral declarations by the United States Government, not only because of their intrinsic soundness but also because they are extremely pertinent at this time for the Committee on Disarmament. On the fairly safe assumption that we shall not in fact arrive in a reasonably short time at an agreement on both types of weapons, it is essential to adopt some other intermediate provision to overcome the virtual deadlock. The form of that measure might be the issue by all States of declarations similar to that of the United States Government. More specifically, States could renounce at once

(Mr. Castañeda, Mexico)

by unilateral declarations the use in war and the manufacture of biological weapons; and could also undertake to eliminate existing stockpiles while waiting for -- I repeat, while waiting for -- the renunciation to become contractual when the desired overall agreement is reached. Thus we should eliminate the immediate danger without having to separate two questions which, as we stated earlier, should remain united.

34. Moreover, in the next few months a propitious opportunity will occur for making such declarations in a collective act of the utmost political significance. They could be made by the Heads of State for the forthcoming celebration, this October, of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations.

35. In conclusion, I believe that our Committee could draw up a model unilateral declaration like that which we have in mind.

36. Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translation from Russian): First, I should like to express my sincere thanks to the members of the Committee for welcoming me here as head of the delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic. I am deeply touched by their consideration and shall try to respond in kind by co-operating with them in achieving agreement on the important questions under discussion in the Committee. Before starting my statement, I too should like to welcome the new head of the Bulgarian delegation, Ambassador Petrov; the new head of the Japanese delegation, Ambassador Tanaka; and my distinguished neighbour, the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Castañeda.

37. In this first statement of mine in the Committee on Disarmament, my main purpose is to deal with the revised draft treaty prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof (CCD/269/Rev.2). In our view the adoption of a treaty on denuclearization of the sea-bed as a partial disarmament measure will have an importance equal to what has been achieved in such other international agreements as the outer-space treaty (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI)); the Moscow treaty on the prohibition of nuclear tests in three environments (ENDC/100/Rev.1); and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (ENDC/226*), which entered into force in March. As we all know, these important international instruments are a positive contribution to the cause of peace and security: they facilitate the taking of other opportune measures of nuclear disarmament likely to provide a good impetus towards the attainment of our ultimate goal -- general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

38. Bearing in mind the convincing spirit that pervades the preamble to the draft sea-bed treaty, the Mongolian delegation would like to state that this document, whose main objective is the prohibition of the use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor for military purposes, is bound to constitute an important step towards general and complete disarmament, and to contribute to the lessening of international tension and the strengthening of confidence between States.

39. During the discussion of the draft treaty some speakers have clearly interpreted it in the sense that for the nuclear Powers its provisions have a real and strictly practical application; while for the other group of countries — the overwhelming majority having no nuclear weapons — the value of this draft is rather theoretical and the prohibition of the emplacement on the sea-bed and ocean floor of nuclear weapons alone is for the non-nuclear majority meaningless. My delegation believes that those who hold this interpretation have arrived at their conclusions in all sincerity and under the influence of the nature and scope of the prohibitions embodied in the draft treaty in its present form. However, in the view of my delegation, an approach to the problem under discussion — and to other important disarmament problems — which is based on a deliberate political division of States into nuclear and non-nuclear categories will in no way contribute to the achievement of constructive agreement on the immediate problems of maintaining international peace and security.

40. As we see it, solution of the problem of the denuclearization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor will be good for all States without exception. It is our deep conviction that in solving the problem of the demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor it is necessary to start from the common interest of all States and peoples in ensuring peace and security, lessening international tension and improving friendly relations between States. At the very beginning the noble idea of prohibiting the use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor for military purposes was based on the assumption that it was to be comprehensive and might be treated as a priority partial measure of disarmament. The complete demilitarization of the sea-bed would fully accord with our common interests and avoid half-measures; or, to put it plainly, this partial measure would not contain what might be called a sub-partial measure. In spite of that, the solution today — not tomorrow — of the problem of the denuclearization of the sea-bed would be of very positive significance.

(Mr. Erdenbileg, Mongolia)

41. Guided by the underlying principle and the spirit of existing international instruments, the majority of delegations in the Committee has favoured inclusion in the operative part of the draft treaty of a provision committing the States parties to continue negotiations in a spirit of goodwill on further steps to exclude the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the arms race. We have never ceased to believe that attainment of agreement on the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed should remain one of the basic tasks of our Committee. We therefore strongly sympathize with the efforts in that direction being exerted by other countries, in particular Sweden and Poland.

42. My delegation is convinced that in any case the basic provisions of the treaty will fully serve to make the obligation of States parties not to emplace nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor or in the subsoil thereof one of the most important norms of international law. In that connexion the Mongolian delegation completely supports the proposal of the Polish delegation urging the Committee to keep on its agenda the question of the demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor (CCD/PV.471, para. 9).

43. I do not intend to go into the history of the problem before us, but wish only to give my views on some of its other aspects. My delegation welcomes the concrete language introduced in paragraph 1 of article I of the revised draft treaty which now prohibits the military use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof beyond the outer limit of a sea-bed zone coincident with the outer limit of the zone referred to in Part II of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the contiguous Zone.^{1/}

44. In our view the obligations assumed by States under existing international instruments relating to partial measures of nuclear disarmament, and their obligations under the principal rules of international law, must not be mutually exclusive but must, on the contrary, be mutually complementary, interacting and consistent.

45. As members of the Committee know, my delegation, speaking on 5 March (CCD/PV.455, para. 18), asked for clarification concerning one aspect of paragraph 2 of article 1 of the draft treaty. My delegation wondered whether the provision in that paragraph was fully in harmony with article I of the partial test-ban Treaty, which prohibits nuclear-weapon tests inter alia under water, including territorial

^{1/} United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 516, pp. 205 et seq.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

waters and the high seas. We believe that the new article VIII in the revised draft treaty answers our question. It reads:

"The provisions of this Treaty shall in no way affect the obligations assumed by States Parties to the Treaty under international instruments establishing zones free from nuclear weapons."

I should like to emphasize that in putting its question to the Committee the Mongolian delegation was guided primarily by its attachment to the idea of complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and by the sincere desire of the whole of mankind to live in peace and work in a clean natural environment.

46. In conclusion, I should like to say a few words on verification. We realize that supervision of the fulfilment of the obligations assumed by States parties under international agreements relating to partial measures of disarmament is an important component of these agreements. The adoption of any effective system of control in this field must have strict regard for the inalienable sovereign rights and security interests of States as established and recognized by international law. We believe that the supervision problem in the field of demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor is essentially a problem of ensuring the implementation by States of their undertaking not to emplace nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor, which make up the greater part of our planet. I would point out that, thanks to the efforts of the co-authors, who carefully took into account in preparing their second revision the principal observations and proposals of a number of members of the Committee, article III of the draft treaty has been sufficiently developed and is now a more detailed and quite generally acceptable text on verification.

47. Concerning the proposal of some delegations to include in the article on supervision a provision concerning international procedures and the good offices of the United Nations Secretary-General, my delegation holds the view that in carrying out this verification there is no need to resort to the establishment of a special international control body. Effective supervision can be fully achieved both on the basis of the right of each State party to keep under observation the activities of other States parties to the treaty on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof and on the basis of the right of States to undertake verification either by their own means or with the assistance of any other State party to the treaty, or by consultation and co-operation between the parties concerned.

(Mr. Erdembilog, Mongolia)

48. In this connexion I fully share the view of the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Roshchin, who stated at our meeting on 7 July:

"A solution to the problem raised by delegations proposing the inclusion in article III of a provision on international procedures and the good offices of the Secretary-General is in fact provided by the right accorded to States in the sea-bed treaty to refer questions concerning the observance of the treaty to the Security Council, which may take action in accordance with the United Nations Charter, and also by the right of verification which may be undertaken by a Party using its own means or with the full or partial assistance of any other State party to the treaty." (CCD/PV.476, para. 67)

My delegation is concerned that discussion in the Committee on the problem of supervision, marked by more and more amendments and observations, should not become a stumbling-block to our joint efforts to complete the drafting of a sea-bed treaty.

49. My delegation is happy to associate itself with those delegations which have congratulated the co-Chairmen of our Committee on their constructive work. The collective efforts of the members of the Committee have been aimed at making the basic provisions of the draft more concrete, at making them generally acceptable in compliance with resolution 2602 F (XXIV) of the United Nations General Assembly. In our opinion the document now reflects in one way or another the comments and suggestions made by various delegations during the debate both here in the Committee and in the General Assembly. My delegation would like to express its appreciation to the Soviet delegation and to the delegations of the other socialist countries for their position of principle and their fruitful efforts to secure speedy agreement on the draft treaty.

50. In this connexion my delegation would like to draw the attention of the members of the Committee to a new initiative of the Government of the German Democratic Republic, which again clearly reflects the truly peace-loving policy of the sovereign socialist State of the German nation. I have in mind the recent declaration of the Government of the German Democratic Republic on questions of disarmament which was addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, and copies of which were circulated a few days ago in Geneva to all the members of the Committee on Disarmament. In particular, the statement underlines the position of the German Democratic Republic on the draft sea-bed treaty, and states:

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

"Such a treaty would free two-thirds of the world's surface from the emplacement of new devices for mass destruction threatening mankind and would thus forestall a further expansion of the arms race. At the same time it would create favourable conditions for further measures to limit armaments and, more particularly, to exclude completely any use of the sea-bed and ocean floor for military purposes."

51. We are also grateful to the delegations of Sweden, Canada and Argentina -- your country, Mr. Chairman -- and to the other members of the Committee whose active participation has contributed to the elaboration of the draft treaty in its present form. The Committee now has the task of completing urgently the drafting of the treaty, whose sole over-riding objective is the prohibition of the use of the sea-bed for military purposes; and this will no doubt have a favourable influence on its peaceful use for the good of all countries and peoples.

52. Mr. IGHITIEFF (Canada): In my statement on 25 June last I outlined Canada's general position with respect to an adequate and appropriate response by this body to General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV). That resolution, it will be recalled, requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to work out --

"... a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which would provide the Conference with a guideline to chart the course of its further work and its negotiations ..." (CCD/275)

53. At our meeting on 2 July the representative of Italy, Mr. Caracciolo, reported to the Committee on certain discussions of a number of delegations which had been considering this question (CCD/PV.475, paras. 15-19). He outlined a proposed format for a section of what he envisaged might be included in the report from the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to the next session of the United Nations General Assembly in response to that resolution, in the form of certain "preliminary considerations".

54. Since then the representatives of the Netherlands, Sweden and Yugoslavia, among others, in interesting and constructive statements have put on record their reactions to the approach suggested by Mr. Caracciolo, and have identified with commendable clarity some of the issues which this Committee will face in developing any comprehensive programme as requested by the General Assembly. Today I should like to comment briefly on the suggestions put forward by the representative of Italy and to develop in somewhat more detail my preliminary explanation of the Canadian position.

(Mr. Ignatieff, Canada)

55. As I indicated on 26 February in my initial statement at this year's session (CCD/PV.453, para. 50), and as I reiterated on 25 June (CCD/PV.473, para. 11), the Canadian delegation welcomes the Assembly resolution on the Disarmament Decade and regards it primarily as an incentive to achieve systematic progress in the next ten years on effective measures of arms control and disarmament. We would hope that the discussion in this Committee on the basis of that resolution would maintain the constructive and forward-looking approach which has already been adopted by the representatives here who have addressed themselves to this subject, so that the resolution would in fact serve to promote systematic progress towards certain agreed objectives within the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. We share the view that the development of such a programme, as my Yugoslav colleague (CCD/PV.478, para. 78) and my Swedish colleague (ibid., para. 33) pointed out last week, should not degenerate into an end in itself.

56. I believe we are all agreed that in considering a comprehensive programme for the Committee we start from common ground regarding the ultimate goal of this Committee, as already established in the principles agreed upon by the co-Chairmen in 1961 (ENDC/5) -- the attainment of general and complete disarmament. That goal, in our view, represents the horizon to which all our efforts should be directed. In that way our present concentration on urgent, specific collateral measures, on which agreement among members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament lies more readily to hand, should not cause us to lose sight of the forest for the trees. I would agree with suggestions put forward that we must focus first on those measures of disarmament which are considered by governments as negotiable at this stage; but in so doing we should always be prepared to assess where any particular proposed measure fits into a pattern of progress towards our long-term objective.

57. We must also keep in mind what Mr. Eschauzier, in his recent statement on this subject, referred to as "the close relationship between disarmament on the one hand, and international peace and security on the other." (CCD/PV.478, para. 7) The representatives of Sweden and Yugoslavia made a similar point: that the elimination of national armaments and armed forces must be related to other efforts to safeguard peace, especially through the United Nations. Obviously, disarmament is contingent upon political decisions taken in the light of national assessments of security interests as well as the international climate. Any programme which neglects to take that into consideration is not only unrealistic, but runs the risk of unnecessarily complicating our own task through building up exaggerated public expectations.

(Mr. Ignatieff, Canada)

58. I should like to turn now to the outline for part of this Committee's report on the issue as described by my Italian colleague on 2 July, and offer some preliminary comments by the Canadian delegation on this approach. As Mr. Caracciolo pointed out, this outline is in the nature of an introduction, leaving to the Committee as a whole the major task of putting forward the detailed proposals which would constitute a "comprehensive programme" for the work of this Committee.

59. My delegation is able to associate itself with that general approach and with many of the observations put forward by Mr. Caracciolo for the consideration of this Committee. I suggest that the outline presented to us could, with minor revisions, form a part of the introduction to or framework for the comprehensive programme which has to be worked out. We welcome it as such and are prepared on the basis of that section to consider the possible content of the remainder of the report with other Committee members, perhaps in an informal meeting of this body.

60. As to points of detail, as I mentioned in my statement on 25 June (CCD/PV.473, para. 13), we rather doubt the wisdom of trying to respond to the United Nations resolution to which I referred (resolution 2602 E (XXIV)) through a revision of matters dating back to the beginning of the previous decade. We should not attempt, for instance, in our view, to embark upon a discussion of the co-Chairmen's draft treaties of 1962 (ENDC/2/Rev.1; ENDC/30 and Add. 1-3), which might risk reopening the polemical debates of that period. Those draft treaties were really comprehensive programmes in themselves and represent the objective of our present discussions. I would suggest, therefore, that if reference is to be made to those drafts in our report to the United Nations General Assembly dealing with general and complete disarmament, that reference might be transposed to the concluding section of any report, where it would serve to underline the fact that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has not lost sight of the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament.

61. In earlier statements I also expressed the hope that this Committee would not get bogged down in a discussion of priorities. That is still my view. For instance, suggestions that the negotiation of a freeze or ceiling on armaments expenditure or actual armaments might be a precursor of progress on collateral arms measures might in fact tend to establish a priori requirements which might delay negotiations on some of the measures now under consideration. In this respect we would wish to ensure that our report made it clear that the special studies referred to in the paragraph entitled "Main Elements of the Programme", as described by Mr. Caracciolo, need not delay the formulation of a comprehensive programme for general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Ignatieff, Canada)

62. We have some minor reservations also regarding the third paragraph entitled "Phases of the Programme". In our view that section of the report must not attempt too rigidly to define and delineate "successive phases". Our preference would be for an approach which, after recalling the positive developments which have already taken place or are about to occur in this body, would go on to enumerate the specific arms-control measures which a consensus of this Committee might judge ripe to open up areas of potential progress. Time-tables and target dates, in our opinion, would not fit in with the complex and politically-sensitive nature of arms-control and disarmament negotiations. Nevertheless, "certain desirable priorities" and "interrelated measures" could be noted if agreement could be reached on these.

63. Indeed, flexibility is essential if we are to reach a consensus. It is for that reason that the Canadian delegation would expect that such a list of measures would include the sea-bed arms-control treaty, the question of the elimination of chemical and biological weapons of warfare, and the exploration of the implications of the responses which have been received to General Assembly resolution 2604 A (XXIV) (CCD/275) on the question of an international seismic data exchange, in the context, of course, of the Committee's continuing pursuit of a comprehensive test ban.

64. But progress towards halting the nuclear arms race must obviously continue to receive primary attention in any programme for the Disarmament Decade and beyond. Unfortunately the record of this Committee suggests that we have approached nuclear arms-control negotiations at a leisurely pace which appears grotesquely at odds with what is literally an issue that affects human survival. In this connexion I was particularly interested in the suggestion made by the Deputy Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia when on 14 July he proposed that the nuclear Powers might consider submitting "within a reasonable period of time -- say three years -- a detailed programme of measures in that sphere" (CCD/PV.478, para. 96). That would be in line with the commitment undertaken in article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*).

65. In the attempt to identify areas in which progress might be possible, attention must be devoted also to regional arms-control measures. In this regard we have the valuable precedent set by the Treaty of Tlatelolco (ENDC/186, pp. 12-33) and the Antarctic Treaty.^{1/} Several other delegations have put forward constructive proposals in this regard, and I might note particularly that advanced by the representative of

1/ United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 402, pp. 71 et seq.

(Mr. Ignatieff, Canada)

Romania on 5 March, when he put particular stress on the importance of examining the possibilities of extending regional arms measures to other areas of the world (CCD/PV.455, para. 78). The representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, also stressed, on 14 July, the important potential available to the Committee in working towards a more peaceful environment through the negotiation of regional agreements, including what she described as "packages" made up of a variety of confidence-building, arms-limitation and disarmament measures (CCD/PV.478, para. 48).

66. In the view of my Government, the present discussions regarding mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe, to which my Netherlands colleague (*ibid.*, para. 20) and the Yugoslav Deputy Secretary of State (*ibid.*, para. 98) drew attention, appear to offer a particularly fruitful area for possible progress on regional agreements of that kind at this time.

67. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, at the twenty-fifth anniversary commemorative ceremony held in Geneva on 6 July, emphasized the dangers of the escalating arms race as well as its rising costs. During this session several delegations have suggested that consideration might be given also to including a freeze on military budgets in any comprehensive programme for the Disarmament Decade. The Canadian delegation would agree that, given the fact that during the past twenty years global military expenditure has tripled, the time has come to give consideration to the possibility of a freeze as an essential initial arms-limitation measure which could lead to balanced reduction of armaments and armed forces.

68. In concluding, I should like to reiterate the plea made by the representative of Sweden for the speedy conclusion of our work on this task. As Mrs. Myrdal said:

"We cannot face the other Members of that body [the United Nations General Assembly] in the autumn without a substantial result. Our rethinking of the disarmament programme should be such as to rekindle their hopes that serious efforts at reaching agreements and implementing them will be made."

(*ibid.*, para. 55)

The twenty-fifth anniversary session of the United Nations General Assembly deserves our best efforts; to offer less could only work to the detriment of this body as a negotiating organ and cast doubts on our ability to be an effective vehicle for the attainment of arms control and disarmament, which successive sessions of the United Nations General Assembly have placed highest in priority in the quest for a peaceful world.

69. The CHAIRMAN (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): Does any delegation wish to speak? Since none does, I will read a notice by the co-Chairmen:

"The delegations of Argentina, Canada, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Pakistan and Sweden have requested that an informal meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament be held on Wednesday, 5 August, to discuss the question of chemical and biological warfare."

Does anyone wish to comment on that notice? Since there are no comments, I declare it approved and that we have decided that the informal meeting will be held at 10.30 a.m. on 5 August.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 481st plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, representative of Argentina.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Mexico, Mongolia and Canada.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 28 July 1970, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/PV.482
28 July 1970
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SECOND MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 28 July 1970, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. R.E. SARAIVA GUERREIRO

(Brazil)

(Previous verbatim records in this series appeared under the symbols
ENDC/PV.1-ENDC/PV.430)

CE.70-16947
70-35479

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Argentina:

Mr. C. ORTIZ de ROZAS
Mr. A.F. DUMONT
Mr. V.E. BERASATEGUI
Mr. M.E. DELPECH

Brazil:

Mr. R.E. SARAIVA GUERREIRO
Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA

Bulgaria:

Mr. T. PETROV
Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV

Burma:

U KYAW MIN

Canada:

Mr. G. IGATIEFF
Mr. R.W. CLARK
Mr. R.E. MOORE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. J. STRUCKA
Mr. F. MARESKA

Ethiopia:

Mr. G. ALEMU

Hungary:

Mr. J. PETRAN
Mr. F. GAJDA

India:

Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. R. CARACCILO
Mr. F.L. OTTLERI
Mr. B. BORSARELLI
Mr. U. FESTALOZZA

Japan:

Mr. H. TANAKA
Mr. H. OTSUKA
Mr. T. SENGOKU
Mr. J. SAKAMOTO

Mexico:

Mr. B. SEPULVEDA

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. Z. ERENDO

Morocco:

Mr. M.A.A. KHATTABI

Netherlands:

Mr. H.F. ESCHAUZIER
Mr. E. BOS

Nigeria:

Mr. C.O. HOLLIST

Pakistan:

Mr. K. AHMED

Poland:

Mr. K. ZYBYLSKI
Mr. H. STEPOSZ

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU
Mr. N. CHILIE

Sweden:

Mr. A. EDELSTAM
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. I.I. TCHEPROV
Mr. L.A. MASTERKOV
Mr. Y.C. NAZARKINE

United Arab Republic:

Mr. O. SIRRY
Mr. M. ISMAIL

United Kingdom:

Lord LOTHIAN
Mr. I.F. PORTER
Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY
Mr. C.H. GODDEN

United States of America:

Mr. J.F. LEONARD
Mr. A.F. NEIDLE
Mr. W. GIVAN
Mr. R.L. McCORMACK

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. BOZINOVIC
Mr. M. VUKOVIC

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Brazil): I declare open the 482nd plenary meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.
2. It is my pleasure and honour to welcome here the new leader of the United Kingdom delegation, Lord Lothian.
3. Lord LOTHIAN (United Kingdom): I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your kind words of welcome to me.
4. I should like to begin by expressing my pleasure and satisfaction at making my first visit to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament after assuming responsibility for arms-control and disarmament matters in the new United Kingdom Government, and taking over as leader of the United Kingdom delegation. I consider it a great honour; and I look forward to the prospect of working with the other members of the Committee in the formidable but worthwhile task with which the international community has entrusted us. There is no need for me to stress the heavy responsibility involved in our work and the expectations with which the peoples of the world, and particularly the young people, look to us for a lead in the search for a more secure and peaceful world. The Secretary-General of the United Nations reminded us when he spoke in Geneva on 6 July (Press Release ECOSOC/378) of the vast sums of money being spent on armaments. We can all think of many better ways in which those resources could be spent to improve the quality of life for our peoples and reduce the gap between the rich and the poor nations. Our task is therefore of the greatest importance.
5. I should like to take the opportunity of this my first speech in the Committee to explain in general terms the United Kingdom's approach to arms control and disarmament under the new Government. My Government intends to continue to play an active and constructive role in this Committee's work. Our aim now, as in the past, is agreement on realistic and practical measures, both of arms control and of disarmament — for, despite the Committee's title, we believe that we cannot confine our attention to disarmament in the strict sense of the reduction of arms but must accord due and full weight to the control of armaments as well. Indeed, we see arms-control and disarmament measures as having the common over-all objective of improving security for all, at, if possible, a lower economic cost.
6. My Government shares with other Governments represented here the desire to reach an ultimate state of general and complete disarmament under effective international control in a peaceful world. But we are not going to bring that about overnight. It will inevitably be a slow process, and we must meanwhile consider all possible steps,

(Lord Lothian, United Kingdom)

however limited they may at first sight appear, which could take us in the right direction. At this point it would perhaps be appropriate for me to say a word about the request put to this Committee in United Nations General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) (CCD/275) to work out a comprehensive programme for disarmament. I hope it will be possible to mark this, the first year of the Disarmament Decade, by agreeing the contents of a programme for our future work. But I believe it is essential that we should take a practical and down-to-earth approach to our work in this Committee, and avoid setting rigid time-tables. The best course is to concentrate our attention on the steps that are most urgently needed and most clearly within reach.

7. The Committee has increasingly come to concern itself with the hard facts of national security interests and, I believe, with the convergence rather than the divergence of those interests. I feel sure that this development can only improve the effectiveness of the Committee as a negotiating body.

8. A prime achievement of the Geneva disarmament negotiations in recent years has been the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*). As one of the depositary Powers for the Treaty, the United Kingdom Government feels a special concern for its progress. Brought into force on 5 March, the Treaty has been ratified by fifty-four States; but there are still difficulties to overcome in the implementation of the Treaty on a world-wide basis. The forty-two signatory States which have not yet ratified it, and the thirty States which have not even signed it, must be encouraged to become parties to the Treaty; for without the full participation of the near-nuclear States the Treaty risks becoming an empty document. For that reason we welcome the establishment of a Safeguards Committee within the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and the efforts that the Committee is making to formulate the contents of safeguards agreements required in connexion with the Treaty. Only by thorough examination of the problems connected with safeguards, and by dispelling the suspicions in some countries that the Treaty discriminates against them, can we convince those countries that the Treaty, by preventing the diversion of resources to nuclear weapons, will promote peaceful nuclear activities throughout the world.

9. An essential complementary need, of course, is to demonstrate that the nuclear-weapon States are themselves carrying out their obligation under article VI of the Treaty to undertake negotiations in good faith to put an end to the nuclear arms race. It is only realistic to recognize that a very special responsibility in this connexion rests with the United States and the Soviet Union. Progress in nuclear disarmament must initially depend on bilateral understanding between those countries. We are therefore encouraged by the signs of progress in the strategic arms limitation talks

(Lord Lothian, United Kingdom)

(SALT) in Vienna. The confidential nature of the talks, and the absence of propaganda, must surely indicate that we can look forward to a positive result.

10. I am sure that we all recognize the great problems that face the super-Powers. But, while it would be wrong to expect rapid agreement, we have no doubt that these talks offer the best hopes of limiting the nuclear arms race and opening the way for further progress in the field of nuclear arms control and disarmament. The successful outcome of these talks would mark a most significant advance in building international confidence and provide a new impetus to our continuing work here in Geneva. If indeed SALT should become a continuing negotiation, we would then have two bodies, one bilateral and the other multilateral, whose work could complement each other fruitfully in the arms-control field.

11. I should like to say a few words now about the co-Chairmen's revised draft sea-bed treaty (CCD/269/Rev.2). My Government welcomes the draft and endorses the aim of banning nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction from the sea-bed beyond a twelve-mile coastal zone. The present draft takes into account the views of many delegations and has evolved from a long process of constructive and thoughtful debate both here in the Committee and in the United Nations General Assembly. As we have heard in the course of this session, the draft does not satisfy all delegations. My delegation too has suggested some changes which we still think would improve the draft. I would accordingly ask the co-Chairmen to look at them carefully when they come to consider a final draft.

12. We believe, however, that all the main elements of a thoroughly worthwhile and timely agreement are now present in the draft. We consider that the reference in the third paragraph of the preamble to further negotiations towards the exclusion of the sea-bed from the arms race is an adequate reminder of the goal to which we all aspire, particularly when it is taken together with the provisions of article VI for a review conference. As to other points which have been raised by delegations this session, my Government too would welcome a reference in article III to international good offices, if an appropriate and widely-acceptable formulation can be found.

13. With respect to the law-of-the-sea questions to which a number of delegations have referred I should make it clear that, where the effect of suggestions made in this Committee is to clarify the meaning of the text, they have our full support. Our underlying attitude, however, is that, where the draft treaty may be held to touch on law-of-the-sea questions, the wording should be as uncontentious as possible so as not to

(Lord Lothian, United Kingdom)

prejudge issues that may have to be dealt with in another forum. I hope that with good sense and good will a widely acceptable text can go forward to the twenty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

14. Turning now to the question of chemical and biological warfare, I should like first to pledge my determination to work for the strengthening of the 1925 Geneva Protocol (A/7575/Rev.1, annex VI), the forty-fifth anniversary of which we celebrate this year. My Government regards that Protocol as the cornerstone of all our efforts in the field of chemical and biological warfare.

15. In our view that end can best be served by continuing to work towards a convention banning the production, possession and use of biological methods of warfare on the basis of the draft (ENDC/255/Rev.1) presented here by the United Kingdom delegation last year. I would strongly commend that convention to the Committee as a practical and realistic measure of arms control and disarmament. With the specific inclusion of toxins, which we accepted formally on 16 July (CCD/PV.479, paras. 12 et seq.), it represents a viable basis for an agreement which lies within our grasp now, dealing, as it does, in a comprehensive manner with a clear and self-contained category of weapons and agents. Such a soundly-based agreement could only serve to strengthen the Geneva Protocol and prepare the way for further measures in the field of chemical and biological warfare.

16. Looking ahead towards those further measures, we recognize the difficulties and problems to be faced in reaching an agreement to deal with chemical warfare; but, as my predecessor Lord Chalfont made quite clear, we shall not turn back from the task. However, I am bound to say that in my view the length of the path we have to tread towards measures to deal with chemical warfare presents no logical reason for a delay in seizing the opportunity of reaching agreement on biological methods of warfare until such time as we are sufficiently far advanced to be able to deal with chemical weapons at the same time.

17. It was in the time of a previous Conservative Government that another major advance took place in the arms-control field — the conclusion of the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty of 1963 (ENDC/100/Rev.1). The negotiations of an adequately-verified comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty and the cessation of all nuclear test explosions for weapons purposes in all environments and by all countries remains high among the aims of the present United Kingdom Government. We recognize, however, that further progress towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty depends to a considerable extent on the kind of agreement which might emerge from the strategic arms limitation talks.

18. In the meantime, however, there is valuable work to be done in our Committee in considering the form that a possible treaty might take and in further discussion of the

(Lord Lothian, United Kingdom)

complex problems of verification. Here I might perhaps remind the Committee of the 1968 United Kingdom proposal (ENDC/232) for an agreement on a quota of nuclear tests on a descending scale, which although a secondary measure could, we feel, be a very useful one. It could be of particular value in a situation in which agreement on a comprehensive test ban had been reached in principle but the super-Powers were not yet ready to accept the immediate suspension of all tests.

19. But the difficult problems of seismic detection and identification remain; and my country, among others, continues to work on these. In that context our Canadian colleagues recently put forward a helpful suggestion for exchange of seismic information (CCD/PV.473, paras. 25 et seq.) which might assist countries to gain increased access to data from existing systems. I should like also to draw attention to the working paper (ENDC/258) circulated by the United Kingdom in this Committee last August, in which the work of United Kingdom scientists was described. That paper reached the conclusion that the next step might be a detailed study of the ways and means of deploying an operational system based on new techniques in order to achieve the enhanced identification capability predicted in the report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Seismic Study Group in 1968.

20. There is increasing interest in the international exchange of seismic data as an aid to verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Replies to the Secretary-General's enquiry called for in General Assembly resolution 2604 A (XXIV) (CCD/275) will enable a comprehensive review to be made of the present status of seismic monitoring of underground nuclear events. In the meantime, as a contribution to such a review the scientists of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority have carried out a study aimed at determining what detection and identification capability could now be achieved in support of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, at what cost and on what time-scale. Their work is embodied in a working paper (CCD/296) which I have pleasure in laying before the Committee today. That study has not attempted, of course, to take into account the replies to the Secretary-General's enquiry. The paper is an attempt to demonstrate on an illustrative basis how the SIPRI prediction might be realized in practice. It is a practical study: every technique described in it is one which we know to be possible; and we have not drawn upon research and development techniques which are not yet proven. I believe that this paper, together with its glossary of seismic terms in the context of the test ban, will help to give purpose to our discussions on this almost intractable problem.

(Lord Lothian, United Kingdom)

21. In conclusion, may I recall that no part of what we are discussing here can be isolated from events elsewhere? Arms control and disarmament are an integral part of national and international security and of all our defence and political thinking. The prospects for strengthening international peace and security look more hopeful now than they have for some time; and the work of this Committee and the mutual confidence established here in the 1960s have played their part in that brighter prospect. I look forward to contributing to the negotiation in the Committee of agreements which will effectively improve world security in the years ahead.

22. Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): First of all, Mr. Chairman, I should like to join you in welcoming the new leader of the United Kingdom delegation, Lord Lothian.

23. In our statement today we should like to deal with several aspects of verification of the prohibition of the development and production of chemical and bacteriological weapons. It seems to us, indeed, that in the consideration of that problem the question of verification is the focus of the attention of some delegations; not only because, like every disarmament measure, it is of primary significance, but also because some delegations are trying to use it as a smoke-screen for their political approach to the problem as a whole. We have witnessed some delegations attempting, on the question of verification: first, to prove that biological and bacteriological weapons should be dealt with as two separate problems; second, to prove that it is necessary, before the concrete provisions of any convention can be discussed, to examine thoroughly all the technical aspects of the problem — that is, to transfer the problem to a purely technical sphere with as much scientific and unpolitical argumentation as possible; and third, to use it as an argument for delaying the solution proposed at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations by the delegations of the socialist countries in their draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons (A/7655), which provides simple but highly effective measures for the speedy achievement of a complete prohibition.

24. In examining the whole problem we have proceeded from the fact that verification of the prohibition of the development and production of chemical and bacteriological weapons might be applied in three different situations: first, as a general control over commercial production and research with the aim of ascertaining that these are not

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

used for military purposes — that is, verification, so to speak, in a normal situation; secondly, in a case where a State suspected violation of the ban by some other State; and thirdly, in a case where a State lodged a complaint that chemical and bacteriological weapons had been used against it.

25. Let us now examine the possibilities of control in those three cases. First, there is the so-called ordinary, normal situation. Let us take bacteriological weapons first. It is known that bacteriological weapons intended to have a local effect do not require any special equipment for their production. It is possible to prepare ad hoc small quantities of a virulent culture in any microbiological laboratory, and to fill ampoules or other vessels with it. The quantity of the culture, or bacterial suspension, would amount to only a few litres. The selection of germs could be limited to bacteria, especially those causing intestinal infections -- abdominal typhus, dysentery, cholera --, anthrax, plague and some others, which could be used for the contamination of places with greater concentrations of people and would do very great harm.

26. It can be said that in a normal situation the control by outside means of bacteriological weapons during their production and research is very difficult, as it is impossible to watch every small laboratory; yet such a laboratory would be able to develop and produce bacteriological weapons in sufficient quantities without any great difficulty. As we have already stated many times in this Committee, there is no need for mass production of bacteriological weapons; nevertheless a large number of institutions and factories could be producing them.

27. In this respect what is the situation with chemical weapons? If we want to form a clear picture of the enormous scale of production of chemical materials designed for peaceful purposes which at the same time could be quite easily used for military purposes, we can proceed from the United States working paper of 16 March, from which I should like to recall briefly the following:

"In the fifty years since the end of World War I, for example, gross production of the worldwide chemical industry has increased in value from an estimated \$5 billion to \$150 billion, approximately a thirty-fold increase. ...

"The everyday production of commercial materials relevant to chemical warfare in the United States, as in other industrially developed countries, is quite substantial. For example, there are nineteen locations for phosgene production and eleven facilities for hydrogen cyanide production in the United States. These produce in total approximately 350,000 tons of phosgene and 200,000 tons of hydrogen cyanide per year for commercial purposes. ...

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

"Elsewhere in the world, there are at least fifty plants involved in the production or formulation, or both, of commercial organophosphorus pesticides in a total of twelve countries, including countries of Western and Eastern Europe. The total world output of the entire organophosphorus pesticide industry is estimated to be in excess of 130,000 tons annually."

(CCD/283)

These, as the document of the United States says, can be used for the production of nerve agents in chemical warfare.

28. From those citations we can see what an enormous quantity of production for peaceful purposes would have to be covered by such a control. And what kind of control, then, should or could be used? Let us look at page 3 of the working paper of Sweden of 30 April (CCD/287). All methods of control so far known and used are listed there in a clear and lucid manner. The first method of verification is called "Collection of information". But what kind of procedure would be needed for the enormous quantity and volume of production of chemical materials? And what kind of procedure should be applied to cover the huge number of laboratories able to produce bacteriological weapons? And, at the same time, who would guarantee that all information collected in this way would really cover everything?

29. Something about this method has been disclosed in the report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The reference is mainly to bacteriological weapons; but it is more or less evident that a similar verification procedure could also be applied in certain circumstances in the case of chemical weapons. The report indicates the incalculable amount of information which individual plants should provide in various questionnaires, including information such as personnel data which would require to be renewed continuously. What machinery would each plant need in order to answer such questionnaires? And what machinery would be needed for the evaluation on an international basis of all the information supplied? And where is the guarantee that all data acquired in this way would really be correct?

30. The United States working paper of 16 July (CCD/293) shows that in the field of chemical weapons so-called off-site inspections are impossible. The same, I am sure, applies to bacteriological weapons. Does that, however, mean that on-site inspection would be more successful? That method of verification raises the well-known problem on which a number of disarmament agreements have already failed. It is evident that regular international supervision of the kind of huge production described in the United States working paper (CCD/283) is not feasible. Similarly, as we have already

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

said, it would be impossible to carry out regular on-site international supervision of every small laboratory. There is no way of securing that this method of verification would really cover everything and not become a mere formality or something else, something even worse.

31. Therefore it now remains to give an answer as to what kind of verification would be practicable in these cases. The Swedish working paper which I have already mentioned lists as the fifth possible method of verification "National self-supervision and inspection". The draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons, submitted by the socialist countries, contains the obligation upon States parties to adopt the necessary legislative and administrative measures in order to comply with the prohibition. In this respect an interesting suggestion is contained in the SIPRI report, Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Part IV, Verification, where on page 49 the possibility is dealt with of using for the purposes of verification, by national means, a national body having an international reputation, such as the Academy of Sciences. The SIPRI report refers to verification in a different context; but we are nevertheless of the opinion that this suggestion is also relevant to our case.

32. Then there is the question of verification in cases where a State might suspect some other State of not complying with the agreement. To cover such a case the delegations of Hungary, Mongolia and Poland have proposed a solution in their working paper of 14 April (CCD/285). As is known, that document suggests that a State which has reasonable doubts about the fulfilment by another State of its obligations may request the Security Council to investigate the case and take all necessary measures. However, before doing that a State party to the treaty having reasonable doubts regarding the fulfilment of its obligations by another State party might consult with other States parties to the treaty in order to clarify the situation. The representative of Japan rightly reminded the Committee of that possibility in his statement of 14 July (CCD/PV.478, para. 69). Just as we believe that mutual trust among nations will grow, we believe that the importance of this kind of verification will grow.

33. Where consultations did not clarify the situation, or if some State party to the treaty refused to co-operate in consultations, then, of course, it would be the task of the Security Council to do whatever might be possible in order to clarify the situation and to save the treaty. It is indeed highly probable that a State party to such a

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

treaty which continued to have reasonable doubts that another State was or other States were fulfilling their obligations would cease to be a party to the treaty, and the whole treaty might collapse. It would, however, be necessary for the Security Council to determine its concrete procedure for such cases; and in our view there are a number of possibilities, including that contained in the working paper of Sweden concerning the various methods of verification under item 2, Inquiry, and other possibilities. However, it would be the duty of the Security Council to verify in practice the observance of the resolution which would certainly be adopted in that connexion and to decide upon the most effective ways of doing so.

34. Finally there is the question of control in the case where a State might suspect that bacteriological or chemical weapons had been used against it. Even if there are limited possibilities for the clandestine use of some kinds of chemical weapons -- for instance, in order to destroy crops, and so on -- chemical weapons could hardly be used otherwise than in a conflict. If someone had doubts as to whether an agent of warfare had really been used in a limited conflict, it would not be too difficult to submit the necessary evidence, such as medical inspection of affected persons, and so on.

35. As is known, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (A/7575/Rev.1, annex VI) does not deal with the question of verification in the case of non-compliance. The best guarantees of compliance with the Protocol were in fact the reservations made by individual countries at the time of signing, from which it is clear that a violation of the Protocol by one party would result in retaliation with the same means by the other party.

36. In the case of a breach of the agreement we are now considering, the Security Council of the United Nations would have to deal with it either on the basis of a complaint or on the basis of its own functions emanating from Article 24 of the Charter. As far as the possibility of retaliation is concerned, we can well imagine that that would always be open, and by other means as well.

37. The situation is somewhat different in the case of biological weapons. They can be used not only in the case of a conflict but also in a clandestine way, in order to weaken the opponent's strength, to reduce the possibility of resistance, to stir up disturbances, and so on. In such cases the Security Council would choose the most suitable form of investigation in order to ascertain that biological weapons had really been used; and, according to the result of such investigation, it would decide upon proper counter-measures.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

38. In conclusion we should like to return to the three points we spoke of at the beginning of this statement. We are of the opinion that if we consider the whole question of verification without any ulterior motives, and especially if we avoid any attempts to justify the lack of willingness to reach a necessary political solution by the difficulties connected with the question of verification, we can state that the questions connected with verification show, first, that chemical and bacteriological weapons are closely connected, among other things by the common problems of their control; second, that a purely technical discussion may serve only as a smoke-screen to cover up the intention to delay a decision; and, third, that a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons, as proposed by the socialist countries at the twenty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly, could be concluded without delay, since sufficient means exist to ensure its observance.

39. Mr. KHATTABI (Morocco) (interpretation from French): I also should like to welcome to our midst Lord Lothian, the new leader of the United Kingdom delegation, who has just delivered a brilliant maiden speech to the Conference. We wish him the greatest success in the mission entrusted to him by his Government.

40. Approaching the thorny problem of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, Mr. Benhima pointed out at our meeting of 21 April that, even if the technical, military and other distinctions between the two categories of weapons, biological and chemical, are recognized,

"... the certain conclusions of such an analysis do not seem to outweigh the advantages of a prohibition of the two categories of weapons simultaneously and the incorporation of that prohibition in a single text." (CCD/FV.466, para. 14)

That comment, which summarizes the preliminary point of view of the Moroccan delegation on chemical and biological weapons, is by no means intended to disregard the difficult problem of defining a system of verification capable of ensuring that the provisions of an agreement prohibiting chemical and bacteriological weapons shall be respected and observed.

41. In view of the importance which my delegation attaches to this vital and urgent question, I have the honour to submit to the Conference today a working paper (CCD/295) based on the outline given by the leader of my delegation on 21 April (CCD/FV.466, paras. 19-23). This document, the object of which is to help simultaneously to

(Mr. Khattabi, Morocco)

reconcile ideas expressed in the Conference and to search for a way out of our impasse, also takes into account resolution 2603 B (XXIV) of the United Nations General Assembly, which requests our Conference —

"... to give urgent consideration to reaching agreement on the prohibitions and other measures referred to in the draft conventions [submitted to the Conference] and other relevant proposals" (CCD/275).

42. While we recognize the important and decisive role of political will in the total elimination of chemical and biological weapons, we have to observe that the international situation and the relations between the great Powers possessing or able to make such weapons are not often such as to promote that mutual confidence which is an essential and indispensable component of political good will. Furthermore, the mutual fear generated by the existence of arsenals of chemical and biological weapons is bound to encourage their proliferation and consequently increase the danger of their use for destructive ends.

43. To promote and strengthen mutual confidence among States it is necessary and urgent to adopt a certain number of international disarmament measures. Thus it is of the greatest importance to conclude an international agreement under which all States parties would undertake the contractual and solemn obligation no longer to develop, manufacture or stockpile chemical or biological weapons, and to destroy existing stocks of these. The salutary effect of such an undertaking both upon international opinion and upon relations between States can easily be imagined.

44. Paragraph 1 of our working paper proposes that the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons, including toxins, should be jointly prohibited by one principal legal instrument which would also provide for their destruction. The draft convention submitted last year to the United Nations General Assembly by nine socialist countries (A/7655) with the amendment submitted by Hungary, Mongolia and Poland (CCD/285), and the draft convention of the United Kingdom (ENDC/255/Rev.1) amended at the suggestion of the United States delegation (CCD/290), appear to contain the main points of this prohibition.

45. To guarantee that the provisions of that agreement are respected and observed, we consider that verification and control procedures might be dealt with separately for biological agents and toxins — whose immediate elimination does not raise any major difficulty — and for chemical agents, whose complexity makes it difficult at present,

(Mr. Khattabi, Morocco)

in the view of certain delegations, to have a control that would inspire confidence in the observance of the provisions prohibiting these agents if designed for military use. Therefore, according to our working paper, we must provide in the principal instrument means for the consideration of problems concerning procedures of verification for the prohibition of chemical weapons. That instrument should, of course, set a time-limit for the drafting of a supplementary document which would definitively lay down the verification procedures for this category of weapons. The convening of a meeting of experts, proposed last year by the Japanese delegation (ENDC/PV.428, para. 47), would in our view certainly be useful particularly to consider the technical aspects of verification relating to chemical weapons.

46. The relation between the industrial and commercial production of chemical agents for civilian purposes and the manufacture of chemical weapons is an important aspect of the problem which should be examined and settled. That problem has already been the subject of a number of working papers and of relevant and constructive comments.

47. In that connexion I should like to emphasize that military reasons should not prevent us from dealing with these two categories of weapons together and enacting their prohibition in a single instrument. It should be made clear, consequently, that the technical aspects of the problem of verification of chemical agents are, in our view, the only ones that should be considered to justify the preparation of a text that could be appended, according to our working paper, to the basic instrument designed completely to eliminate chemical and biological weapons.

48. Before concluding, I should like to express my delegation's gratitude to all those who have helped our work forward by presenting working papers or suggestions on this question. In that connexion we listened with the keenest interest to the remarkable statement made on 21 July by Mrs. Myrdal, the Swedish representative (CCD/PV.480), who clearly described the main features of an agreement combining the advantages of the two draft conventions before us and at the same time providing valuable material for a completer and more broadly acceptable agreement. We consider that the analysis she then made deserves the closest consideration by this Committee. We sincerely hope that the efforts of the members of this Committee will enable us to accomplish the important task entrusted to us by the United Nations General Assembly.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 482nd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Ramiro E. Saraiva Guerreiro, representative of Brazil.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia and Morocco.

"The delegation of Morocco submitted a working paper on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons (CCD/295).

"The delegation of the United Kingdom submitted a working paper on the verification of a comprehensive test ban treaty (CCD/296).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 30 July 1970, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/PV.483
30 July 1970
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-THIRD MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 30 July 1970, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. T. PETROV

(Bulgaria)

(Previous verbatim records in this series appeared under the symbols
ENDC/IV.1-ENDC/IV.430).

GE.70-17354
70-35527

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Argentina:

Mr. C. ORTIZ de ROZAS
Mr. A.F. DUMONT
Mr. V.E. BERSATEGUI

Brazil:

Mr. R.E. SARAIVA GUERREIRO
Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA

Bulgaria:

Mr. T. PETROV
Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV

Burma:

U KYAW MIN

Canada:

Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
Mr. R.W. CLARK
Mr. R.E. MOORE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. J. STRUCKA

Ethiopia:

Mr. G. ALEMU

Hungary:

Mr. J. NEMRAN
Mr. F. GAJDA

India:

Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. R. CARACCILOLO
Mr. F.L. OTTIERI
Mr. R. BORSARELLI
Mr. U. PESTALOZZA

Japan:

Mr. H. TANAKA
Mr. H. OTSUKA
Mr. T. SENGOKU
Mr. J. SAKAMOTO

Mexico:

Mr. M. TELLO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. Z. ERENDO

Morocco:

Mr. M.A.A. KHATTABI

Netherlands:

Mr. H.F. ESCHAUZIER
Mr. E. BOS

Nigeria:

Mr. C.O. HOLLIST

Pakistan:

Mr. T.O. HYDER

Poland:

Mr. W. NATORF
Mr. K. ZYBYLSKI
Mr. H. STEPOSZ

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU
Mr. N. CHILIE

Sweden:

Mr. A. EDELSTAM
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. I.I. TCHEPROV
Mr. L.A. MASTERKOV
Mr. Y.C. NIZARKINE

United Arab Republic:

Mr. O. SIRRY

United Kingdom:

Mr. I.F. PORTER

Mr. J.T. MUSEFIELD

Mr. C.H. GODDEN

Mr. R. HOULISTON

United States of America:

Mr. J.F. LEONARD

Mr. A.F. NEIDLE

Mr. W. GIVAN

Mr. R.L. McCORMACK

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. BOZINOVIC

Mr. M. VUKOVIC

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): I declare open the 483rd plenary meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.
2. Before I call on the first speaker I have a painful duty to perform. It is with profound regret that I announce the sad news of the death of the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of Mongolia, Mr. Luvsandorjiin Toiv. I am sure that I interpret the feelings of the whole Committee in requesting the Mongolian delegation to convey to their Government and to the family of the deceased our most sincere condolences.
3. I now call on the representative of Poland.
4. Mr. NATORF (Poland): Since the adoption of resolution 1722 (XVI) at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly it has become obvious that general and complete disarmament has been proclaimed to be the ultimate goal of any forthcoming disarmament negotiations. One must admit that, ever since, a consensus has existed as far as that objective is concerned. To a large extent the same is true of priorities. One can hardly find a single delegation, either in this Committee or in the General Assembly, which would not assign the highest priority to the abolition of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Yet the progress made in the last decade towards those commonly-recognized objectives, although significant, has not been fully satisfactory.
5. Differences have frequently arisen as to whether general disarmament should always be given absolute priority or whether collateral measures of disarmament, aimed first of all at lessening international tension and consolidating confidence among States, could be considered initially as steps towards the broader goal of general and complete disarmament. Past experience shows that our main goal cannot be achieved in one single stroke. Collateral measures of varying importance have so far proved to be a realistic way towards our goal. We believe that partial measures aimed at strengthening confidence among States, and preceding measures of disarmament proper, are extremely important for speeding up the whole process of disarmament.
6. This year our Committee is faced with the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, which calls upon this body to work out "a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects of the ... cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament ..." (CCD/275) As stated here

(Mr. Natorf, Poland)

previously, during the spring session certain States discussed the details of a possible programme. The delegations of the Soviet Union (CCD/PV.466, para. 28 et seq.) and Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.469, paras. 24 et seq.) presented their views on that question at our meetings on 21 and 30 April respectively. Since our session reconvened in June, other delegations have expressed their views on this matter, in particular those of Japan (CCD/PV.471, paras. 25 et seq.), the United States (CCD/PV.472, paras. 2 et seq.), Italy (CCD/PV.475, paras. 2 et seq.), the Netherlands (CCD/PV.478), Sweden (ibid.), Yugoslavia (ibid., paras. 75 et seq.) and Canada (CCD/PV.473, paras. 11 et seq.). I should like to assure the members of this

Committee that we shall study carefully the statements made in that respect and, since the majority of them were qualified as preliminary by their authors, I should like now to present the preliminary views of the Polish delegation on this question.

7. Some representatives, and particularly the representative of the United States, Mr. Leonard, have elaborated at some length on the general conditions which must prevail in the international situation if we are to achieve real progress. We agree with a number of those points as well as with the statement that the negotiations on different measures of disarmament do not take place in an abstract, ideal situation but must take into account the hard facts of life which have a definite impact on the international scene. In line with that, we believe that the complete elimination of hot-beds of crisis such as those in South-East Asia and the Middle East is an important factor which influences disarmament negotiations. We all realize that progress in disarmament cannot be dissociated from world peace and world security. That is why we believe that as long as the vestiges of colonialism persist, as long as colonial wars and other military action against national liberation movements are in progress, our task will not be an easy one to fulfil. Nevertheless, we should continue our efforts to secure positive results in our field of activities, bearing in mind especially that progress in disarmament negotiations produces a direct beneficial effect on world peace and international security.

8. We believe that, together with the intensification of the work of our Committee, that of other organs of the United Nations should also be accelerated — for instance, the work on devising a generally-acceptable definition of aggression and on reaching agreement on United Nations peace-keeping operations on the basis of strict observance of the Charter. We understand that the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States is about

(Mr. Natorf, Poland)

to complete its work, and we hope that it will submit a positive report thereon to the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly.

9. Of course, the application of the principle of universality in the United Nations and the admission to the United Nations of the two German States would contribute greatly to the solution of various problems. In the first place, it would create the possibility of including all the nuclear Powers and all the militarily-significant countries in the process of negotiations on disarmament.

10. Since we all believe that disarmament, world peace and international security are interrelated, a number of measures could be undertaken to make fuller use of the machinery of the United Nations for the implementation of certain provisions of the Charter which have not yet been sufficiently applied, or have not been applied at all. Let us take, for example, the provisions of Chapter VIII referring to the establishment of regional security systems in different parts of the world.

11. In reference to regional security systems, it is worth recalling that global security is composed of security elements within individual geographical regions. In this matter a specific role falls to Europe. In this connexion I cannot but express my satisfaction that in Europe the idea of strengthening security and promoting co-operation among European States is gaining ground. In Europe today all the responsible political forces seem to realize that the political structure of the continent which has emerged in the quarter-century since the end of the last war cannot be altered by military force without destroying everything. Although that is obvious, it is paradoxically in the heart of Europe that the forces of the two most powerful alliances continue to face each other. Europe is still the scene of the deadliest concentration of modern weapons in the world. It is not surprising that, more and more, politicians who think realistically are beginning to feel that the guns and rockets accumulated in Europe are pointing at the shadows of the past — namely, at the cold war.

12. As is well known, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the socialist States parties to the Warsaw Pact have emphasized constantly that they do not link a European security conference with any preliminary conditions, and that the final agenda of such a conference should be discussed and prepared by all the interested parties. What is of particular interest for us, the members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, is that collateral, regional measures of disarmament are on the proposed agenda and that there is a high degree of probability that the European conference will establish a permanent body which, among other things, will negotiate those measures of regional disarmament.

(Mr. Natorf, Poland)

13. In that connexion my delegation notes with satisfaction that the Deputy Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, Mr. Vratasa, said in his statement here on 14 July: "the present positive trends towards strengthening European security and promoting co-operation among all States should be encouraged." (CCD/PV.478, para. 98) On the same day the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, said: "A recommendation to start regional negotiations should, however, have high priority." (ibid., para. 48) The Polish delegation, for its part, wishes to express its conviction that the European conference for security and co-operation might well be the beginning of the road at the end of which the word "deterrence" would be replaced by the word "confidence". Our final goal would then be within our reach.

14. From what has been said in this Committee about our future work, and in view of our quest for a long-term disarmament programme, one may now assume that a variety of approaches is possible if not desirable. There are opinions to the effect that the programme should consist of a number of consecutive objectives at which we should aim in the course of the decade. For our part, we believe that we cannot anticipate in the same manner what can be done during each part of the whole decade. For instance, the most immediate objectives can be defined with greater clarity than those with which we shall have to deal after the implementation of measures which we now consider to be ripe for solution.

15. We shall have to adjust our work to the consequences of international events independent of this Committee or even of the United Nations framework as a whole. We believe, for example, that if substantial progress is made in the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) the possibility of agreement on measures dealt with by our Committee will be considerably greater. Similarly, an important impact upon our programme can be expected from successful results of the conference on European security and co-operation. It seems to us — to use terms from the field of economics — that we shall need both long- and short-term planning. If we want to approach this problem with a sense of realism we must at the outset establish where and how it will be decided that measures are ripe for negotiations, and later, after the accomplishment of a series of positive steps, what other issues have become ready for solution.

16. Before we attempt to answer that question, let us examine the technical experience so far acquired in the field of disarmament negotiations. At the outset it is worth emphasizing that conference machinery and techniques have been successfully

(Mr. Natorf, Poland)

adapted to the peculiar needs of disarmament negotiations. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, with its particular pattern of representation and organization, has fully proved its usefulness. The General Assembly, on the other hand, has shown beyond any doubt that it can provide guidance and also act as a link between the United Nations and the disarmament machinery operating outside the formal framework of the Organization.

17. Therefore, if we want to become up-to-date on the state of negotiations taking place in the following four forums, which will probably be dealing with different aspects of disarmament — the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the United Nations, the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) and the standing committee of the European conference on security —, it will be wise to have recourse to the representatives of States participating in all those negotiations; and in this case that means the representatives of the USSR and the United States of America, who happen to be co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

18. Hence we would suggest that a long-term programme of disarmament be elaborated on the basis of the many well-taken suggestions made in this Committee and of other proposals which may still be advanced during our debate or even at the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly. Such a programme should provide the guidelines and a framework for organized efforts with a view to undertaking action in this Committee and at the United Nations. The remaining negotiating forums dealing with disarmament, although independent, should also be encouraged by this programme.

19. This long-term programme should guide the shaping of short-term programmes not exceeding, for example, a three-year period — and preferably less than that — to allow of adjustments resulting from new requirements. We would suggest that the elaboration of short-term programmes be entrusted to the co-Chairmen, who would prepare them in consultation with the different groups of States represented in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

20. It has become an uncontested fact in this Committee, in the United Nations and in world public opinion that nuclear disarmament should be given priority. At this point I should like to associate myself with the view aiming at widening this priority so as to include other weapons of mass destruction, as suggested by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, on 14 July (CCD/PV.478, para. 36). However, in order to avoid any misinterpretation of the term "weapons of mass destruction" I would limit their scope to what is described today as atomic, bacteriological (biological)

(Mr. Natorf, Poland)

and chemical means of warfare. My delegation highly appreciates the noble humanitarian motives which animated the Swedish delegation in proposing the most comprehensive interpretation of that expression. We believe, however, that neither the political bodies responsible for the conduct of disarmament negotiations nor public opinion at large are yet prepared to identify weapons of mass destruction beyond what are generally known as atomic, bacteriological (biological) and chemical means of warfare.

21. Bacteriological (biological) and chemical weapons, in addition to their analogy with nuclear weapons as far as the effect of their use on the civilian population is concerned, have revealed themselves as being weapons of first use by an aggressor. That is why I would suggest that in the comprehensive programme for disarmament top priority be given to the elimination of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological (biological) means of warfare.

22. When dealing with nuclear disarmament we have concentrated on separate measures generally resulting from commitments stemming from the entry into force of a number of treaties, such as the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 (ENDC/100/Rev.1) and the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968 (ENDC/226*). Both of those treaties are of a preventive character. Their effect cannot be measured by the technical results achieved in slowing down the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. We are convinced that in the case of the Moscow Treaty such an effect has been achieved for a certain period of time following the signature of the Treaty. Further, we have no reason to doubt that the non-proliferation Treaty will prove to be fully effective in definitively stopping the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, in strengthening international security through the concrete commitment of the Security Council in its resolution 255 (1968), and in developing the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

23. The most important achievement of those two Treaties is that they have created favourable conditions for further efforts to stop the arms race and to implement effective measures for banning and, as we sincerely believe, also for destroying nuclear weapons in the future. It is true that in the course of our negotiations, especially in our attempts to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty, a variety of technical obstacles that have been raised and coupled with unequivocal demands to establish on-site inspections as the final means of control have prevented us from finding a solution. I am afraid that today we are still preoccupied with technicalities instead of striving for a political solution.

(Mr. Natorf, Poland)

24. In the past we were told by several delegations that national means of control for the supervision of the ban on underground nuclear testing were not adequate. Today we note with satisfaction that leading United States experts, such as William Foster, former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Harold Brown -- both of whom were authors of articles published in the April 1969 issue of Foreign Affairs -- affirm that the control of disarmament can be settled without particular difficulty, in view of the development of national methods of control. That is precisely what we are proposing by way of safeguards in a comprehensive test-ban treaty and in the treaty banning the development, production and possession of chemical and bacteriological (biological) means of warfare and requiring the destruction of existing arsenals. So we can see that what is needed is a political decision on those measures which have so far been blocked by the verification issue.

25. The Polish delegation agrees with the statements made by the representatives of Sweden and Japan at our meeting on 14 July, when they stressed that some general ideas on the verification issue ought to be elaborated in a comprehensive programme of disarmament (CCD/PV.478, paras. 50, 57 et seq.). We agree with that suggestion; but we are firm in our conviction that we should concentrate our efforts on an exhaustive study of the use of national means of verification.

26. My delegation is convinced that the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly will approve the text of a treaty prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed. We should then proceed with measures concerning conventional weapons, in order to free that whole area for extensive peaceful exploitation.

27. As we have stated on several occasions in the past, Poland welcomed the non-proliferation Treaty, not only because of the advance which it represents towards international security and the further extension of co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by virtue of the commitment contained in its article VI, but also because of its article VII, which is quite explicit in asserting that the priority of nuclear disarmament applies also to disarmament efforts pursued on a regional scale.

28. We are approaching the fourteenth anniversary of the Polish proposal for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Europe^{1/}. Two of the elements of

^{1/} Official Records of the General Assembly, twelfth session, plenary meetings, 697th meeting, paras. 136-137.

(Mr. Natorf, Poland)

a nuclear-free zone have been taken care of by the non-proliferation Treaty: namely the non-production and the non-acquisition of nuclear weapons by States parties to the Treaty. The Polish Government considers it extremely important that there should be early ratification of the non-proliferation Treaty by all European States. After the entry into force of the non-proliferation Treaty on the territory of European non-nuclear States, Poland will be prepared to propose new measures of regional nuclear disarmament, taking into account what will already have been achieved through the non-proliferation Treaty and other arrangements possibly resulting from the European security conference.

29. We should like to stress again that the starting-point for a disarmament programme should be the implementation of already-existing resolutions and arrangements limiting the scope of development, possession and use of nuclear weapons. Similar significance should be accorded to the complete elimination of bacteriological (biological) and chemical means of warfare. Poland will continue to support disarmament initiatives which effectively limit the threat of war and lead to the lessening of the heavy economic and social burden which the present arms race constitutes.

30. As may have been noted, I have not been able to touch upon the many other complex problems related to a disarmament programme. I have commented on those which we consider to be of primary importance. In conclusion I wish to reaffirm that the Polish Government considers that the task of paramount importance before this Committee is the achievement of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. At no time in its history has mankind ever known disarmament on a global scale. All the greater, therefore, is the challenge facing us when trying to draw up a programme which would speed progress towards that goal.

31. Mr. EDELSTAM (Sweden): Delegations will find before them today a working paper (CCD/297) containing some suggested amendments to the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof (CCD/269/Rev.2). The working paper is formally sponsored by the delegations of Burma, Ethiopia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia.

32. The changes proposed in the working paper refer to article III, where in paragraph 2 a slight amendment is suggested to make certain that knowledge of the beginning of a verification procedure as well as its results is spread among all parties;

(Mr. Edelstan, Sweden)

and in paragraph 5 it is suggested that mention should be made of the possibility of verification being undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. Finally, it is proposed that a new article should be added to the present text spelling out the undertaking of the parties to continue negotiations regarding a more comprehensive prohibition of the use of the sea-bed for military purposes.

33. The merits of those proposals have been developed in detail in earlier statements by the sponsoring delegations. I feel, therefore, that it would be superfluous to repeat them here. At this stage I wish only to repeat that the sponsoring delegations have been inspired by the sole consideration of making the final draft treaty generally acceptable first to this Committee and later to Members of the United Nations. We hope, therefore, that the working paper will be studied in that same spirit by the other delegations, particularly by the co-authors of the draft, and that a new and, as we hope, final draft of the treaty will contain these three modest changes.

34. Mr. EDEMBILIG (Mongolia): My delegation is grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, for the sympathy you expressed on the sad occasion of the death of Mr. Luvsandorjiin Tolv, the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of Mongolia. I shall immediately convey to my Government and to the family of the deceased that expression of sympathy in the name of the Committee.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 483rd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Tania Petrov, representative of Bulgaria.

"Statements were made by the Chairman, and the representatives of Poland, Sweden and Mongolia.

"The delegations of Burma, Ethiopia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia submitted a working paper (CCD/297) on the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof (CCD/269/Rev.2).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 4 August 1970, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.15 a.m.